


Party Organizer



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PARTY ORGANIZER

VOL. VI. AUGUST-SEPTEMBER, 1933 No. 8-9

WHY THE OPEN LETTER?

"Why are we holding an extraordinary Party conference at this time, and why are we proposing that this conference shall issue an open letter to the Party? It is not alone because of the extreme sharpening of the crisis and consequently of the class struggle and of the danger of imperialist war. Above all, the reasons for these extraordinary measures lie in the fact that in spite of the serious beginnings of revolutionary upsurge among the masses, yet our Party has not developed into a revolutionary mass party of the proletariat.

"This extraordinary conference and the open letter are designed to rouse all of our resources, all of the forces of the Party to change this situation, and to give us guarantees that the essential change in our work will be made. The letter represents the most serious judgment of the situation and tasks of our Party and our leadership."
—(From Comrade Browder's report at the Extraordinary Party Conference).

"To carry out the task of winning the majority of the working class every Communist Party shall establish, extend and strengthen *permanent and intimate contacts* with the majority of the workers, wherever workers may be found."
(Resolution of Twelfth Plenum of the E. C. C. I.)

"The American Party must mobilize the masses and concentrate chiefly on the struggle: 1) For social insurance, against wage cuts, for immediate relief for the unemployed. 2) For assistance for the ruined farmers. 3) For equal rights for the Negroes and the right of self-determination for the Black Belt. 4) For the defense of the Chinese people and the Soviet Union. It is necessary to carry out the decision on the turn in the work of the Party and the Trade Union Unity League."—(Resolution of the Twelfth Plenum of the E.C.C.I.)

THE Open Letter of the Extraordinary Party Conference to the membership of the Party aimed to arouse the entire Party to action. The Open Letter re-emphasized in the sharpest manner that our Party, if it is to become the indisputable leader of the American workers in the day-to-day struggles against capitalism, winning them for the battle to destroy capitalism, must make a rapid turn to approach, organize and win the decisive elements of the American proletariat, especially in the mining, steel, marine, railroad and textile industries.

The Open Letter found immediate response in the ranks of our Party members. Even non-Party workers and poor farmers greeted the Open Letter as an instrument which will spur the Party to greater activity. Dozens of letters poured into the *Daily Worker*, from workers and farmers, Communist and non-Communist, enthusiastically pledging to improve the work, critically analyzing wrong methods of work. These letters have many lessons for our entire Party.

What do these letters show? These letters once again reaffirm the deep revolutionary ferment rapidly embracing large strata of the American workers and toiling masses, a ferment which is pregnant with sharp class battles already evidenced by the growing strike movement involving hundreds of thousands of workers. This is only another indication that the American workers are looking for a way out—and will follow a militant class struggle policy providing we *know how* to bring it to them simply and clearly. These letters emphasize once again that the task of the entire Party is to organize and lead the masses into struggles.

Secondly, these letters fully bear out the statement of the Open Letter that our Party members *will work*, that our membership will prove itself in the present situation as the force which can move the Party forward on the path towards becoming a mass Party.

Our Party members have been stirred. This is also evidenced in the district and section conferences that are now taking place throughout the country. What is necessary now is to *organize, plan the activity of the members, direct this activity precisely in those channels which will entrench the Party among the basic sections of the American proletariat.*

Need Resolutions, Experiences from Shop Units

But letters and resolutions have not yet come in from our shop units, from our comrades in the large steel plants, from the mines, from the waterfront, from the railroads—from those workers upon whose activity depends that change in our work necessary to trans-

form our Party into a mass Party. This still reflects the insufficient mobilization of these decisive sections of our Party membership.

The Open Letter gives the key by which the change in our Party will take place—through concentrated activity, systematic day-to-day work of the major forces of our Party in selected large plants, developing struggles around immediate issues, preparing the workers for strike struggles, and convincing them by our unflinching and determined defense of their interests that the Party has the correct policy and can lead their struggles. When the Party will be able to win under its influence the workers in the strategic plants, set these workers in motion, these struggles will serve as a lever for the penetration into other factories.

From almost its very inception our Party has put forward the need for rooting itself in the factories, mines and mills, converting each factory into a fortress of Communism—a stronghold of the Party. But while the Party has made some headway in this connection, has done some good work in the shops, in the main it still remains isolated from the most important sections of the American proletariat. It is this fundamental problem that faces the entire Party today—how can we root the Party in the important and decisive factories?

Must Root Party in Strategic Factories

Our Party cannot penetrate all the factories at once. We have to select the most strategic factories, those factories which have a key position in capitalist production, which embrace the largest number of workers, and carefully, persistently, tirelessly win these workers under our leadership.

It is of the most tremendous political importance that our Party shall therefore throw its forces in the first place into steel, mining, railroad and marine industries. And in these industries to select those factories in which through the systematic and planned activity of the Party, we can gain a foothold.

Need Permanent Organization in Basic Factories

In line with our final revolutionary perspectives, in line with winning the masses of American workers not only for immediate struggles, but for the struggle for power—these key industries, these strategic industrial cities and towns will be a determining factor in deciding the victory of the proletarian revolution. Unless permanent organizational connections are established with the workers in these industries, there can be no guarantee for a rapid development of our Party, nor that we will be able to effectively organize the resistance of the working class to combat and defeat the capitalist offensive.

This is the central line of the Open Letter. It is this fundamental problem which must be understood by every Party committee, by every Party member. It is in this direction that every task of the Party must be planned. Our Party membership has the necessary will, the determination, the prerequisites, to solve this fundamental problem. What is needed is more political clarity on this central task, more direct personal guidance and assistance from the higher committees, more careful and systematic planned work, more controlled Communist activity.

The exchange of the vital experiences of our Party in carrying out our work of concentration will be a medium through which to improve the work of our Party as a whole. "It must be absolutely clear that positive criticism and *practical proposals*, and *comradely material exchange of political opinions*, for improving the work of the Party are a vital necessity." The critical examination of our work made by the Open Letter requires that every one of us approach our work with the same seriousness, but also requires an exchange of experiences and "political opinions" in the first place on our work among the workers in the factories, mines, railroads and ports.

Political Clarity and Collective Action Guarantee Carrying out Open Letter

This issue of the *Party Organizer*, which contains some of the best experiences of our Party, some of the best contributions to the examination of our Party work, by the comrades gathered at the Extraordinary Party Conference, should be carefully studied by every Party member. This issue of the *Party Organizer* should be one of the instruments through which to bring to every Party member the tremendous requirements demanded of our Party today, especially in the light of the present developments in the United States and the concerted attacks upon the masses of toilers contained in the Roosevelt program—in the National Industrial Recovery Act.

What is needed is collective action of the entire Party membership, from the top to the bottom. If every Party member, every Party committee will pull in one direction, the Party can and will carry out the tasks laid down in Open Letter.

"Without daily work among the broad masses, without daily struggle for the defense of their living interests, the Communists, in laying claim to the leadership of the masses, can only isolate themselves."—Kuusinen.

ROOTING THE PARTY IN BASIC INDUSTRIES

Whether the toiling masses of America will go upon the path of determined class struggle, whether they will take the road toward the revolutionary way out of the crisis of capitalism, or whether they will be turned into the channels of social-fascism or fascism—this question will be decided by the work of the Communist Party. If our Party can gather all its forces for a profound change in its work and really make a Bolshevik turn to the masses, can assume the full responsibilities of leadership of the growing strike movement, the struggle of the unemployed; really build a solid base for itself among the most decisive strata of the working class, the workers in basic industry; if our Party can really gather around it the non-proletarian masses who are suffering under the crisis—only then will the Communist Party of the United States really have measured up to its historic responsibility. Only then will we really have shown that we understand the basic teachings of Lenin. (*From Comrade Browder's Report.*)

MINING

From Speech of Jack Johnstone, Organizer of Pittsburgh District

I want to take up a couple of our strike struggles and the work in one of our concentration steel factories, and try to analyze them in the light of the Open Letter and the report of Comrade Browder.

I will take first the Avella strike. This strike involved eight mines, led by the National Miners Union on the basis of the united front from below. We had a tendency throughout our Party toward the theory of the general strike, that is, that the miners could not win victories unless they went out on a general strike. The result of this was extremely disastrous, because this ideology also permeated the workers.

So what was the result when the strike took place? Our analysis of the situation was that we could not expect a general strike and that we could probably have 10 or 12 or 13 thousand miners on

strike. Our analysis was correct. Thirteen or fourteen thousand miners came out on strike, but some of our leaders and many of the miners were disappointed; they expected 50,000 or 30,000 or 40,000. The result was that although the Avella strike lasted a month, at no time were we able to develop enthusiasm and a fighting spirit.

Did we mobilize our Party members? Yes, we mobilized our Party members in preparation for the strike and we defeated every effort of the U.M.W.A. to split the ranks of the strikers. We defeated every effort of the government which made a cut of 75 per cent in the relief of the unemployed miners in order to force them to take the jobs of the miners on strike. We organized two hunger marches of the unemployed and strikers and not only defeated this cut but forced on the relief list every striker down to the last man. We had a broad united front strike committee; we carried out every necessary and correct action. But something was fundamentally wrong with our strike—a strike under our undisputed leadership, a strike in which there was no question about our leadership—when one day of terror could wipe us out of existence so completely that we were blown out of the picture, until today we have not yet made contact in that strike area.

Wrong Concentration Fatal Error

Why was this possible? First of all we were not concentrating correctly nor sufficiently. Neither our units, nor our N.M.U. locals, nor our fractions functioned during the strike. This is a fatal error. In strikes a constant daily check-up on decisions is necessary. Yet it was two weeks before we found out that no recruitment had taken place for our union or for our Party, that the Party organizers and the union organizers down there had not even asked one miner to join the union itself. We were kept busy chasing the U.M.W.A., to keep them from splitting the ranks of the strikers—very correct to follow them up, correct that we should stop them. But in doing this we neglected to mobilize our own forces and allowed the enemy to secretly organize their terror forces while we didn't even carry on a campaign or organize a defense corps to meet this terror.

In strikes and in concentration we must not allow anything to interfere with the proper functioning of our Party, our Y.C.L. and our revolutionary union. These functions must not be less, but on the contrary, they must be increased, not as a separate force from the strike but as an integral part of the strike itself. We have to learn how even to lose a strike and still win the workers.

In the Avella strike we said that we must permeate every organ-

ization in Avella, but we did not do it. We don't hand the rank and file of the American Legion over to the fascists, yet we did so with the rank and file miners.

Party Face Hidden in Our District

In our District our units never appear as organizations of our Party; they appear as Unemployed Councils or the N.M.U. and never as Party organizations fighting against the lower units of the government. And, of course, their political level is never above that of the mass organizations in which they have contact. In Westmoreland County our organizer, Comrade Wolly, appeared for the first time in the name of the Communist Party. Wolly was the leader of the Needle Trade Workers strike. Miss Pitt, a government conciliator, trying to disrupt the strike, came out before a mass meeting of strikers and accused our comrade of being a Communist. He had to admit he was a Communist and explained to the workers present the program of the Party. And no one was more surprised than Wolly to find that the girls voted to accept him as leader and sent the government official back to Harrisburg. Thus it is very clear that we must bring our Party before the workers. The fact that we do not indicates, of course, a lack of faith in the workers, an idea that the workers cannot understand and do not want our Party.

United Front Action Defeats Wage-Cut

A few words about concentration in the Jones-Laughlin mill. We have been concentrating in this mill for years. The comrades said the mill was 85 per cent foreign-born, and there were no youth. But there were many young workers and Negroes. Here we were able to create a tremendous foment by organizing anti-wage-cut committees. We also developed a united front of organizations on the outside that helped the workers fight against the wage-cut, so that the employers were not able to put the wage-cut into effect. Then what happened? After the cut was withdrawn all our new workers disappeared, because we did not press forward these anti-wage-cut committees into action committees inside the mills, to fight for their daily grievances. There was also a struggle of 30 young workers in the mill who refused to work until they received overalls, and they won this demand, separate from our committees and without our knowledge. Though the mill is all on part time, yet every worker is compelled to be at the gate every morning to find out whether he has work or not. This is a general grievance which we can utilize to carry on real activity. It is necessary to know the most simple, elementary demands of the workers in the mills and to recognize the importance of struggle around them.

WE BUILD THE UNION

From Pat Toohy's Speech, D. O. of Colorado District

I should like to relate some of the developments which have taken place in the state of Utah. There are 2,300 coal miners as well as other miners. Among these miners are Japanese, Chinese and other nationalities. Our district buro decided to commence a campaign in that field.

Some two months ago the Utah section of the Party held a special conference to consider penetrating the mining fields and industry in Utah. Up to that time a phenomenal growth of the Party in Utah had taken place from six members in 1932 to about 300 several months ago, but it was hollow and based on the unemployed. The special conference decided to try to penetrate the coal sections of Utah and establish the union and Party in those sections.

1,300 Join National Miners Union

After the conference laid down decisions the comrades went to that section and found a few connections in the field. They commenced working from door to door, and mine to mine. They established new connections and took advantage of the existing economic conditions. After a while the beginnings of a union organization were established. Later on the possibility of a strike arose, and by that time the National Miners Union was established side by side with the Party in the field. After one month's activity among these 2,300 miners, 1,300 are definitely signed up in the National Miners Union. The same can be reported, on a lesser scale, in the state of New Mexico.

U.M.W.A. on the Outside Looking In

By that time the U.M.W.A., under the provisions of the Recovery Act, decided to enter the field, but were a little too late. Our comrades had a firm control over these workers and the U.M.W.A. was looked upon as outsiders. The U.M.W.A. immediately began working with the coal operators and the authorities, trying to horn in. There was such open collaboration between the coal operators and the U.M.W.A. that every miner in the field immediately rejected the United Mine Workers. And after all their conspiracies and all the pressure of the A.F. of L. union, we can say that the situation is firmly controlled by our Party and the National Miners Union in Utah.

Build Party Side by Side with Union

Another point I would like to speak about is the age-old question of when the Party comes into a situation. In the past we have gone through many huge struggles, with thousands of workers involved, and after it was all over and the band stopped playing, we looked around and found nobody left. Adequate preparations were made to guard against this by making the comrades understand that the Party is not something isolated from the general struggle, but simultaneously with the development of struggle, Party organizations must be set up.

We Utilize Struggles to Involve Farmers

Our Party has attempted to utilize the struggles of the miners to establish connections among the farmers, not only for struggle but for relief in the strike. We also mobilized the unemployed throughout the district to check on the scab employment offices and shatter any attempt made by these offices to send in scabs and strike-breakers.

What will come of the situation in Utah I do not know yet. Great pressure is being brought by the national and state A.F. of L. by the authorities, by the Mormon Church and by the companies in an effort to oust our comrades from the field and bring in the United Mine Workers. But because our comrades entered the situation first and became deeply entrenched, it will be very hard to oust us.

ILLINOIS COAL FIELDS

From Speech of Leading Comrade of National Miners Union

IN the mining field the Open Letter must mean a whole lot, but we have something else that calls for our attention—we have the United Mine Workers, this organization that we speak about being so discredited. This organization is carrying on a big campaign throughout the mining fields. We also have an example in Westmoreland County of what can happen if we who are building the oppositions, if we of the N.M.U., do not hesitate and lag behind, if we are there at the proper time to give the proper lead. Westmoreland County was never organized, although they had strikes—and yet while I was there I found that every coal miner in that town belongs to the U.M.W.A.

Concentration Lacks Continuity

Now in Illinois. In Illinois we have Trotskyites, I.W.W.'s, Socialists, Musteites, the Progressive Miners, the Democratic organization that is in control of the Progressive Miners, and certain people trying to organize a new federation of labor to compete with the A.F. of L. Here our organization had very little influence. We carried through a policy of concentration. But between the last plenum and this one we did not continue this concentration, and therefore we had some bad results. We decided to concentrate on Gillespie, the key place. We built unemployed organizations, we got individual cases and fought for them and got relief for them, and as a result of these struggles we were able to make the relief in this county the second highest in the state. We were able to organize a State Hunger March. We were able to get into the locals of the Progressive Miners and into the auxiliaries. But after this we moved the headquarters to Springfield. I was sent to Springfield, and we went away from our base of activity. However, when we left Gillespie, the Trotskyites and other elements did not leave.

Not Building Party Biggest Mistake

Our biggest mistake was that we did not build the Party. Very few members were recruited and no units were built at all.

I believe that the lessons we had in the beginning when we carried through a policy of concentration are very important and we have to continue that policy of choosing certain places to concentrate on and using these places to spread out.

In connection with the Pittsburgh District; when I was there we were preparing a strike. We decided that the proper thing to do was to let everything go and pull Vesta Mine No. 4. We pulled a strike in No. 4 and the next morning the other mines came out too, and I think the same policy must be followed in every mining town. There is always a key mine to which the workers look for leadership, and what this mine does it is very easy to get the other mines to do.

"When we search for the reasons for our previous failures to make this decisive change, we must emphasize one key question which explains most of our failures. The Open Letter states this very sharply. It clearly establishes that among all our weaknesses, the central point is the failure to understand the decisive role played by the workers in the basic industries, in the most decisive industrial centers, in the most important big shops and mines."—From Comrade Browder's Report.

STEEL

From Speech of a Leading Comrade of the Steel and Metal Workers Union

CONSIDERING the conditions in the steel industry and the reactions of the workers to the Industrial Recovery Act, we now have an opportunity to do some real work in the steel industry for building both the Party and the Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union.

What has been the effect briefly of the Industrial Recovery Act among the steel workers? Several comrades have pointed out (Comrade Williamson of Chicago, Comrade Zack) that the effect of the Industrial Recovery Act is one of arousing to a certain extent whole masses of steel workers. In many respects they are laboring under certain illusions as to what this Act means to the steel workers. It is true, as some comrades have reported, that the steel workers feel that they have now the right to organize, and express themselves and I want to bring this out by a little incident which happened recently.

In the——Steel Corporation, at——(a company town) one of our union members was nominated to run for office in the company union. On the day of the election he got up and made a speech in the mill and told the workers that he was running for office in the company union not because he believed in the company union but because he thought it would help the workers if he could bring the program of the Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union into the company union. This was unheard of in the——, that a worker should get up in the company union and express sentiment against the company right in the mill, but he reflected the illusions of many thousands of workers in the industry who believed that they had the right to express themselves in the company union.

We, therefore, as Communists, must take advantage of this situation as much as we possibly can to entrench both the Party and the union in the mills.

New Developments Due to Recovery Act

The Industrial Recovery Act has also brought forward another new development in the steel industry which is very significant for our Party and union. Namely, that the A.F. of L. has come forward in the steel industry in certain sections (Youngstown, Ohio) and are campaigning there for the first time since 1919, attempting to win workers into their unions and are utilizing our approach to the workers in this campaign, talking industrial unionism, utilizing

our phraseology, conducting street corner meetings, soap box meetings, house-to-house campaigns, etc.

Briefly the Industrial Recovery Act has to a big extent aroused the workers in the industry. What have we done? I think we have been very slow in reacting to this situation. It has taken us a long time, in fact, to realize particularly in this period, that the workers are beginning to move. The breaking out of strikes up in Monroe, Buffalo, etc., is an indication that workers are getting ready for struggle and we have not been politically alert enough to come into the situation as an independent force.

Our organizational position is very weak. We have only issued in the union some 1,400 membership books; we have some forty groups throughout the country and we are not conducting sufficient struggles of workers or winning workers to struggle in this situation.

Sharpest Reorientation of Districts Toward Steel

I want to say that if we expect to accomplish even the minimum of the tasks assigned to us by the Open Letter, there will have to be the sharpest reorientation in these districts toward the steel industry. There will have to be an assignment of the very best forces in the district for work in steel. There will have to be the very closest political attention given to this problem. Forces, finances, mobilization of the language organizations, etc., are necessary in order that these things are properly carried through. What are our tasks in mobilizing the Party and union to carry through the tasks that are facing us?

It is necessary that the Chicago, Cleveland and Pittsburgh districts immediately select certain concentration mills—in Illinois, steel; _____, _____, _____, and that these mills become focal points of attention for the entire district from the district bureau down to the units in the districts. It is necessary that we assign not only ordinary forces but that we assign our best and most experienced forces for this particular task and above all that we draw in from within these mills local forces that are and that can be drawn into activity.

Utilize Unemployed to Build Union

In the Pittsburgh district we have taken steps recently for the development of these local forces and we have found that there is a wide field that we can reach—forces that we can reach at the present time. For instance, in the Pittsburgh district there are fifteen thousand registered members in the Unemployed Councils. Many hundreds of these are steel workers. We have been able through work in these Councils to gradually draw in some of these local

elements from the Unemployed Councils as union organizers. These workers are from the mills and have intimate contact with the workers in the mills and know the problems of the workers in the mill.

Comrades, these elements, these local new fresh forces will enable us to develop struggles in the industry. It has been a general practice and tendency not only in the Pittsburgh district but in Cleveland and other districts to consider work among the unemployed in the industrial town as entirely separate from the union. It is by utilizing these forces for work in the steel mills, for work in developing the Party and union that we will be able to accomplish our task to a big extent.

Editorial Note:

Since this speech was made, the Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union carried on an extensive campaign in connection with the National Recovery Act, and code hearings in Washington as well as through states. As a result of this thousands of steel and metal workers have since joined the union.



LESSONS OF THE ACME STEEL STRIKE

THE Acme strike is a direct result of the successful termination of the North Buffalo Hardware Foundry strike. The Acme Steel and Malleable Iron Works employs about 200 workers, including Negroes and women. The average wage before the strike was 30c an hour for men, and 20c for women. The strikers demand an 8-hour day, \$5 a day for molders, \$4 a day for grinders, improved conditions and recognition of their shop committee.

The strike assumes tremendous importance primarily because we were able during the course of the 2 weeks struggle to arouse the entire Polish Section of Black Rock and involve thousands of workers, men and women and children, unemployed and shop workers, Negro and white. As a result of the correct leadership and most strenuous activity we succeeded in: 1) breaking through, to some extent, the most vicious terror unloosed in Buffalo, by rallying as many as 5,000 neighbors on the picket line in support of the 150 strikers, 2) Organizing the Acme shop into the Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union *during* the strike, thus making it easier to force the bosses to recognize the shop committee, 3) organizing a women's council, 4) make a start in organizing the children of the neighborhood and of the strikers, 5) organizing a shop unit in the Acme *during* the strike. Many outstanding mistakes and weaknesses

could and should (in subsequent articles) be discussed. However, the purpose of this article is to analyze the role our Party played in this struggle. What were the tasks of our Party? How well did we carry through these tasks?

How the Strike Was Called

On the 10th of July, several of the workers of the Acme plant came to the Section organizer of the Party and told him they are ready to strike and asked for directions on how to proceed. About 40 workers were rounded up, demands worked out and arrangements for a larger meeting made. The next day about 75 workers came to the meeting at which they decided to strike the following day, July 12th. About 125 workers responded. Some of the machinists (at least two of whom are members of the A. F. of L.), the whole patternmakers' department and the straw bosses refused to go out. The molders are the decisive department; they took the initiative in calling the strike and are out solid.

There are a few Negro workers in the shop. The comrades in the first strike meeting had the white workers take a unanimous vote to support the Negro workers in the struggle, and vice versa. A few women work in the shop also, and they receive less wages than the men, but are supposed to be doing lighter work.

At the outset a strike committee of 13, including Negro and women workers was organized, representing each department except the patternmakers. Picketing was organized. A publicity committee was elected, which was successful in securing considerable publicity in the local press; a functioning relief committee, capable of caring for the needs of the strikers; a defense committee, though too narrow, effective in the handling of the preliminary steps in arrests. Also delegations from the strikers have been sent to the police, etc., to demand the stopping of police interference on the picket line, demanding the right to carry banners on the picket line, etc. Also later in the strike, women's auxiliaries have been organized with a large number signed up, and perspective of permanent organization. Likewise children's troops have been organized.

The strike is led by the elected strike committee, which meets at least once each day. The leading Party members are not members of the strike committee, but meet with it, where all steps to be taken up are planned and discussed, and then presented to the general strikers' meetings. The members of the strike committee are assigned the part each is to bring to the meeting and given guidance on how this should be done. The Party members speak on questions which come up during the general meeting and which the strikers are unable to solve themselves, also raising the discussions to a higher political

plane. During the first few days the Party members spoke too much and too often, but this was soon corrected.

Mass meetings of the strikers and others are held every night at which the strikers are the main speakers, the Party members politicizing the issues, exposing the A. F. of L., as well as countering such suggestions as bringing rifles to the picket lines, bombing the plant, etc. Because of the newness of the workers to struggles and the relatively small number of strikers, the leading comrades were compelled to picket with the workers the first few days in order to prevent the collapse of the picket lines. One definite result of these mass meetings, which were undertaken for one thing to raise the morale of the strikers which was very low in the first few days, was that on Friday (21st), over 5,000 men, women and children marched to the picket line, stoned and broke all the windows on the busses transporting scabs, sent several scabs and one bus driver to the hospital; with mass indignation against the police, scabs, etc., running high.

The Party and Union Built during Strike

Before the strike the Party and the T.U.U.L. had no contacts in this plant. Within the first few days four members were recruited into the Party and a nucleus formed which is the leader in the strike committee. These four constitute the leading members of the union. From the first day, members were recruited to the Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union. To date, about 125 workers of this shop have signed applications, and 30 have paid full initiations, and the others have paid part. The workers of this plant receive very small wages and need relief, being unable to pay initiations and dues. The vice president of the union is a Negro.

Shortcomings and Errors

Despite many significant achievements for the Party in this strike, there are on the other hand very serious shortcomings and errors. The first and decisive error made was that the Party section organizer permitted the workers to tell the night watchman not to fire the blast furnaces when they were ready to strike. The demands should have been worked out more carefully; the present ones being maximum demands. (NOTE: the strike is still on, and the errors and shortcomings stated have been criticized, and steps taken to overcome them. The period to which this criticism applies is mostly for from July 12th to 22nd.) The neglect of the Party is partly explained, but not justified, by the fact that most of the leading comrades were absent from the district during the early part of the strike. Briefly, the main shortcomings:

Insufficient Mobilization of Party around Strike

1) The Party units in the strike area were not mobilized in support of the strike, and for recruiting new Party members, etc., 2) no directives were sent to the other sections and units on the strike or on any other issues, 3) the Party was not brought forward in its independent role, organizing mass meetings, etc., in support of the strike, having Party representative speak at the strike meetings, organizing Party members from the units to go on the picket line, selling literature, *Daily Workers*, etc., 4) Though the Y.C.L. organizer has been in the strike from the first day, yet no Y.C.L. unit has been formed, not only from the strikers, but the whole neighborhood which is there and struggling. The Party bears the responsibility. 5) Insufficient publicity in the *Daily Worker* on the strike. The *Daily Worker* has not been sold in sufficient numbers, and most of the time not at all. In this connection it is necessary to point out that the *Daily* made an error in cutting down the article on the strike, appearing in the Monday (24th) issue. 400 copies of this issue were ordered to be sold to the strikers, and the article having been cut, was discouraging to the strikers. 6) The Unemployed Councils have not been involved as an organization, though the members have been very active from the start. The I.L.D. has been brought into the situation. The strikers' defense committee was elected under the direction of our comrades, yet the I.L.D. was not sufficiently brought forward in its independent role; a committee was formed to work with the strikers' defense committee. I.L.D. attorneys will be used, and the strikers' meetings are utilized for protest and demanding the release of the arrested workers, rousing the strikers and others against the police. The W.I.R. is as yet in no contact with the strikers' relief committee, though the W.I.R. has an office there.

Scabs Recruited Because Party Failed to Mobilize Masses

An extremely important issue arose in this strike from the fact that the employers resorted to the tactic of using Negroes to scab, creating a situation threatening race riots. The Negroes were recruited in the Negro section of the city, miles away from the strike. This is important to bear in mind, in connection with the falling down of the activities of the Party units in this and in other areas, as a result of neglect of them, and it was far more difficult to mobilize the masses in that area (especially the Negro territory) to combat this vicious practice. This is being done, however. The L.S.N.R., I.L.D. and the strike committee have issued joint leaflets, held joint street meetings in the Negro territory, mobilized Negroes to go to

the picket line, etc., and thus have succeeded to rouse sentiment against Negroes being used as scabs, directing the anger of the white workers against the real culprits, the bosses; informing the Negroes that they are being hired to scab, since many of them do not know this.

The employers are aware of the significance of this seemingly "small" struggle. They have concentrated upon it all their forces, the police, attempting to introduce the A. F. of L. through the police and the employers, radio talks against the strike by the Chamber of Commerce, Johnston of the local A. F. of L. Central Labor Council declaring it an "outlaw" strike.

Did We Carry thru Our Tasks?

In the main we did. *But how?* Not in an organized and planned manner. Party members were on the picket line. Party members were collecting relief, helping in the defense, speaking at the mass meetings, etc. Leaflets were issued, open air meetings were arranged, resolutions were sent in. However, this was done in a haphazard, unorganized way. The Party members did these things not because their *units* planned them, not because they received directives from the District to do so, but because many Party members had nothing else to do and when they came to the strike headquarters we involved them in the various phases of work. Our Party apparatus and organization were almost entirely neglected. Therefore, in spite of the good work of the few Party comrades who were leading this struggle, we can say definitely that the entire strike was weakened because of our failure to have mobilized the Party in an organized manner. These lessons, once they become the property of our entire Party, will help us improve our work in the other strikes and struggles brewing everywhere.—*Steel Worker*.

"It is idle chatter to speak about the leading role of the Party without establishing contacts with the decisive strata of the workers, mobilizing these workers and winning them over to our side."—From Open Letter.

CONCENTRATION

*From Speech of B. D. Amis, District Organizer of Cleveland,
Polhuro Member, C. P., U. S. A.*

THE question of concentration in our District revolves around not only more and better forces for the Union, but also for the Party and mass organizations, including the press—especially the language press. Here in these decisive sections it is necessary that we take more seriously the question of utilization of our forces. We have to work out the particular task of each unit, of each nucleus in the mine or in the factory, of each branch, of the mass or language organization; how to mobilize comrades to keep in touch with activities going on there, to send reports to the language press, to develop struggles and activities of these workers.

Around such a program it will be easier for us to carry out campaigns of exposure of our enemies in this particular point and tell the workers who are their friends and who their enemies.

First Task—Building Solid Contact With Workers

The question of concentration has been approached from a different angle by some comrades in our district. Our comrades have voiced the opinion that if we are going to build the Steel and Metal Workers Union (that is some of the comrades—not all of them) or if we are going to build up a strong movement among the miners, the first thing we must do is open up a headquarters, have a trade union center where workers can meet and gather. My opinion is that this is incorrect to start with.

The first thing that we have to do is build up a foundation for a trade union headquarters, create a basis for this union headquarters by making solid personal contacts with the workers in the neighborhoods, shops, factories, mines, winning their confidence, organizing them into small committees, such work, comrades, gives us a basis not merely for opening up a union headquarters but also creates a basis for financing such a headquarters.

The incorrect methods we have used in concentration work are, in my opinion, the reason why we have not been able to lead a great number of strikes. It has been noted by the majority of comrades here that we have not been the real leaders in the great number of strikes that have taken place. Many comrades have spoken about the will of the workers to struggle, not only to struggle but to come out on strike. Many know that. The A. F. of L. and other reformists who have led strikes know it. This only shows, comrades, the great possibilities that exist for us and shows also that

our methods of concentration have not been serious in that we have not concentrated our forces in a particular spot, we have not thrown all our energies into a certain spot and carried on a struggle right there.

Again the poor methods of concentration give rise to the cry for cadres. Surely if we carry through correct methods of concentration, if we were actually among these workers, participating in their struggles, right out of these struggles we would be able to develop new cadres and get real American elements who would become excellent forces for the trade union and the Party. Therefore, comrades, my opinion is this: One of the central points in the Open Letter, and that was given great emphasis in the report of Comrade Browder, is the question of the methods of concentration. We have already seen some excellent results from Detroit, also from one or two strikes in New York—the needle trades, etc., as to how comrades carried through concentration work correctly.

UNITED FRONT ACTION

From Speech of M. Johnson, Buffalo District Organizer

THE Mooney campaign was the first major united front action carried through by our district. It was very successful, considering the inexperience of our comrades. We succeeded in bringing to this conference 14 American Federation of Labor locals, including switchmen and railway clerks. We also united many organizations from which we were isolated in times past.

The conference has served as a stimulus to building up the movement. As a result of a follow-up we have succeeded to some extent in penetrating four more A.F. of L. locals and in making many contacts that we are planning to crystalize into an opposition movement within the A.F. of L.

At the mass send-off of delegates to the Chicago Mooney conference we carried out an exposure of the Socialist Party leaders for their failure to participate in united front actions. As a result we were able to contact many Socialist workers and we can say that through this exposure we were able to win over a Socialist organization of nearly 200 members.

In the Unemployment League we have succeeded in building up a powerful opposition movement against the Executive Committee of the Socialist Party. This unemployed organization went on record condemning the Executive Committee of the Socialist Party and elected delegates to our united front conference. This is our

first serious beginning in the penetration of these organizations under the influence of the S.P.

These experiences have been popularized throughout our district so that they can become a guide to the other sections and units in their dealings with the Socialists and other organizations in the work of building the united front.

We have developed some strike struggles—approximately 13 shops have been on strike in the last few months. One of the most outstanding was the strike of the North Buffalo Hardware—a shop that employs about 400 workers. They went on strike against a wage cut of from 23½ to 31 percent. The comrade who was in the situation from the start was carried away to some extent by the spontaneity of the movement and did not realize that he is there to give direction and purpose to this strike. As a result, a set of demands were worked out that were impossible to win at that stage of the fight.

Win Minimum Strike Demands

Immediately after the first meeting of the strike committee when we discussed the question of demands, one of the workers came in and objected to the demands. He stated that the demands raised by the strikers are too advanced. I asked him what he proposed and he said that at the present time the demands should be the following: Recognition of the shop committee; no discrimination against strikers and withdrawal of the 23½ to 31 percent wage cut. This worker said these demands would strengthen the workers and they will be in a position to win the day rate. Some comrades felt that he was there for the purpose of breaking the strike, but I thought we should accept this set of demands and present both to the workers for final adoption.

At the meeting of the strikers it was decided to keep the original demands and hold the minimum demands in reserve. We succeeded in winning the minimum demands from the employers. This victory greatly stimulated the morale of the workers. Already 308 workers have joined the Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union. The Union is carrying on activity openly in the shop for 100 percent organization.

Make Contacts in Airplane Shop Strike

There was also a strike in the Consolidated Airplane Shop, involving more than 450 workers. They went on strike against a reduction in wages that came as a result of reduction in hours. They stayed out on strike two days and forced the employers to reduce the hours and guarantee them the same wages as for the

longer hours of work. During the strike we succeeded in making quite a few contacts and through these contacts we are attempting to overcome the mistakes which they made during the struggle, such as the failure to build up the union in the shop, etc.

Now with regard to the struggles for Negro rights. We can register some progress in the tying up of actual instances of discrimination against Negro workers with the Scottsboro case. We did this on the basis of comparison of relief given to white workers with relief given to Negro workers. As a result of these struggles, we have developed a mass influence and following among the Negroes. A couple of months ago a Negro stevedore was murdered by a group of white hoodlums. We organized a mass protest funeral in which more than 3,000 Negro and white workers participated. So effective was this that we forced the Negro reformists and clergy into the action. Our most outstanding achievement in this action was our ability to direct the indignation of the Negro masses into the channel of class struggle.

MARINE

From Speech of a Leading Comrade of the Marine Workers Industrial Union

THE line of the Open Letter and the report of the Political Buro are to enable us to understand why we have not been able to establish a firm basis among the decisive sections of the proletariat and to indicate the steps which we have to take to overcome this gap.

We still have the fundamental task of establishing firm contact with the workers in the basic industries. What contact have we with the workers in the marine industry—one of the most important sections of the working class, one of the decisive industries in the struggle against war? Comrade Browder brought forward a correct estimation of our position in this industry. The Marine Workers Industrial Union is not a mass union nor has it led mass struggle. We have not consolidated our organization. There is still a large turn-over in the membership, but the recruiting of new members in most ports is more satisfactory than it has been for a period of three years. A national organization that is carrying on systematic work under the control of a national leadership has been developed. A relatively large cadre of forces, most of whom are young Americans, has been developed. A number of small struggles have been carried through on the ships

during recent months and the union has established contact with the longshoremen and is really beginning to carry on systematic work among them.

Must Change Methods of Work

Of equal importance is the struggle of the unemployed that the union has initiated. Mass struggles in our industry have not yet developed due both to subjective and objective reasons, but the recent struggles, the growth of the organization, the intensification of the activities of the reformists and renegade organizations, all indicate the growing mood for struggle among the masses. And even with the base that the Party now has, we have an extremely favorable opportunity for penetrating this decisive industry. The Party must be aroused to this possibility, this perspective of building and establishing a mass Marine Workers Industrial Union. Shortcomings, weaknesses and obstacles that have hindered the work must be overcome by the most energetic application of the line of the Open Letter and Comrade Browder's report.

Why have we not progressed more rapidly in the marine industry? The basic reasons, of course, are our methods of work, the slowness of the leadership in developing a struggle policy, our sectarianism, isolation from the workers in reformist organizations. Even where we are weakest, where little or no support is given to the work, mistakes in policy are responsible for unfavorable results. I emphasize this because there have been tendencies in our own ranks to fail to understand that the solution of our problems lies first in an improvement of our daily work and carrying through a correct policy.

Orientate Party toward Marine Industry

The fact that the work in our industry is largely separated from the general work of the Party is also a major factor; Party committees have little contact with the work, do not assume responsibility for work in the industry as a major task. The Party in seaport towns is not orientated or mobilized for the task.

What is the basis of this problem? I want to cite an example: We have had requests from Norfolk for the past six months for a longshore organizer. This section is new and especially weak. We sent an organizer down there—what did we find? We found a longshoreman who was a Party member, a capable agitator and fine speaker; one who has considerable influence among the longshoremen, who can be developed into an organizer. And all the time the section has been clamoring for forces to be sent in. How was this comrade used? While he was working on the docks, largely through his own initiative, he developed groups on a number of docks. But mainly because there was no guidance from the Party,

mistakes were made and a number of workers, including this comrade, were victimized and ousted. He was then drawn into what the section and he term "mass work," away from the waterfront—general activity, building the I.L.D., circulating petitions. He became completely isolated from the docks. The I.L.A. had a group which they were maneuvering with. This group didn't wait, but continued to grow and built its own dock committee. These unorganized workers struck for an increase in wages, and the Party didn't have anything to do with it, except beginning the work and then dropping it.

This is an extreme example, but generally true of all seaport towns. The conception is that some little section of the movement is responsible for the work and that it is not the major task of the Party as a whole to work in any decisive industry—marine, metal or coal, shop work to develop the economic struggles, whether marine or any other industry. The Open Letter is correct when it states there is a lack of political understanding of the necessity to strengthen our base among the decisive sections. Until we acquire this understanding and assume the responsibility of centering our major activities in the important industries, we can make no progress.

Bring Party Face to Waterfront

Recently there has been some improvement in connection with the work of the Marine Workers Industrial Union and the orientation of the Party as a whole. But there is not enough and not as much being done as can be done under the present situation. Much of the change has been formal and forced. It is reflected in reports, but not in actual work.

The problem of bringing the Party's face to the waterfront is a burning one. It will not be solved if the Party will appear only through the fraction in the union. It must appear through the fraction in the union, but also as a Party openly before the workers.

I believe that the line of the main report and the line of the Open Letter can insure our going ahead, if it is carried out. I say this conference will become an Extraordinary Conference, only if it does something extraordinary; if it goes over from words to deeds. And we must have guarantees that there is going to be a change. We must really for once get down to the heart of one of these open letters and remove some of the obstacles that prevent progress.

"It is idle chatter to talk about the revolutionizing of the working class by the Party unless the Party conquers a firm basis for itself among the miners, metal and steel workers, railroad workers, auto, marine and textile workers."
—from the Open Letter.

HOW AND WHERE TO CONCENTRATE

*Excerpts from Speech of Charles Krumbein, N. Y. District
Organizer*

CONCENTRATION in connection with mass work is the beginning of the solution of our problems. Of course, we cannot underestimate the difficulties that we will have in breaking with our past methods. We can see from where we are entrenched in New York that we have never taken concentration seriously. We have worked hard, being everywhere and therefore generally being nowhere. We must understand that to the extent that we are successful in gaining important fields, we will have tremendous effect on other fields that we do not concentrate on. That is a point which must be stressed.

Now in regard to concentration on the industries that are important: Marine *first and foremost* for New York City. New York City is the biggest port in the world. It is not only a question here of the number of workers in the industry; the political importance must be seen by us. And fighting the war danger does not mean for us only mass meetings. It means work in the basic industries that are so close to war, industries that will be decisive in war.

Our Approach in the Past

What has been our approach in the past? We take a comrade, assign him to the waterfront and consider the problem solved. But the real problem is to break down the mechanical separation of Party and mass work, mobilizing the Party members on the waterfront so that we multiply the efforts of any specialist we send down.

Next, metal. Metal is very important for us. Although the comrades in the Metal Workers Industrial Union have done good work, they have not yet done any important concentration. For example, we had a comrade in Brooklyn where a section of this basic industry is located, and because of strikes in little shops here and there that came up we pulled him out, kept him out for four or five weeks, and by the time he returned those we had worked with had no further confidence in us. If we mean concentration seriously, then we must see that our comrades stay put.

Concentrate on Transportation

Next on concentration for New York: railroad. On this we have done practically nothing, although the issues are there for us to mobilize the railroad workers.

Another point I think we should consider for concentration is city transport. Transport in all big cities plays a very important political role. I think it is a field that we must concentrate on. We have nothing there yet. In addition to concentrating on transport we can use the election campaign that we are now entering to put forward the proper issues, connecting the question of low fare, as it affects the workers generally, with the conditions of the transport workers.

Now I want to state that on the question of concentration the District leadership must set the pace. Each and every one of us on the staff must give his major attention to a point of concentration. I don't mean the whole industry; I mean picking out certain points of concentration within the industries. We must set the pace.

We Must Guide the Sections

Section leadership: we have got to give very serious consideration to this. What is the situation today in our district? Today we find a flow from the sections to the District—the section organizers come in, we take up problems with them, they go back to the section. This is not the way to develop section leadership. Systematically, regularly, we must go down to the section committee, take up their problems with them, so that the whole section leadership is developed, in place of bringing one comrade into the center and developing only him as a result. Furthermore, we must immediately review our entire leadership, our entire activity in the sections; see who is engaged in mass work and bring these comrades into the section leadership. On the other hand, some of the comrades now in the leadership must get into mass work, and this must be done simultaneously.

Unemployed Members Responsible for Unemployed Work

What do we find in the unemployed situation? I venture to say that the percentage of unemployed in the Party is greater, because of the victimization, etc., than it is in the mass as a whole, yet not over 10 percent of our unemployed comrades participate in unemployed work. Our unemployed comrades do not consider unemployed work as their main field of work. They are not working, they are off all day; the unemployed likewise are not working and are off all day. The opportunities are tremendous and we must see to it that every unemployed comrade has as his main task the unemployed work.

The same applies, of course, to other fields. We have a situation in the trade unions where less than 50 percent of our comrades participate in the fractions and less than 10 percent are active in the trade unions.

On the Election Campaign; I want to say that this campaign will be successful if we are successful in our unemployed work and in our concentration. Only to the extent that we broaden all our work, will we have a real broad election campaign.

Build Daily in Election Campaign

I want to say a word about the Daily Worker. New York, of all districts, has the main responsibility to the Daily Worker. We must see to it that this question is seriously put in the foreground. We must see to it that the Daily Worker plays its role in every bit of work we do. During the election campaign we expect to have a Sunday edition, building it up to 100,000 each Sunday. The Daily Worker must be the organizer of struggle, and out of struggle we must build greater circulation.

On the question of the exposure of the bureaucracy in the A. F. of L. and the S. P., I want to say that to the extent that we do basic concentration work, to the extent that we develop our mass work, to the same extent will we win the A.F. of L. and S.P. workers to us and at the same time will we expose the fakers, because we expose their faces on the basis of the day-to-day struggles.

Develop Political Life in Units

In closing I want to refer to the question of recruiting. To the extent we do mass work, to the extent we are conscious of the need of building the Party, to the extent that we concentrate on basic industry, will we be able to solve the problems of composition of the membership, of building shop nuclei—the building of our Party. Mass work means real political life in the units. Real political life in the units means interest to the workers we bring in, it means their development, in means working for results and it means keeping our Party members.

I want to conclude by saying that if we work out the correct solutions for our problems, we will go ahead by such leaps and bounds that even the most optimistic of us will be surprised.

On the question of recruiting and that twin question of Daily Worker circulation, these two things that are the very lifeblood of our whole movement, how many comrades take this question seriously? We must establish recruiting as a normal part of our Party life, so that every member of the Party constantly has two, three, four or five workers that he is in contact with, preparing them to become members of the Party, working on them systematically, talking with them, giving them literature, engaging them in discussion, developing them politically, bring them to the

Party, and himself personally taking them to the Party unit, adjusting them to Party life, becoming their guide in the very difficult task of becoming a Communist Party member.

These things, building the Party, recruiting new members, circulating the Daily Worker, these are the very essential elements of carrying through struggle. Before struggles, during struggles and after struggles, these things are the constant tasks of the Party. But we forget it. We divert all of our attention to things of second consequence and neglect this basic task. In this respect also we even forget the history of our Party. How many times has the Party celebrated the anniversary of its birth? It is one of the tests of conscious existence if a Party will remember its own birthday or not. Our Party forgets its birthday. Our Party has got a birthday coming next September, and we want to make this Party birthday a campaign of education of our Party members and broad circles of sympathizing workers in the history of our Party, the significance of our Party, as a means of Party recruiting and Party consolidation.—From Browder's Report at Conference.

BUILDING PARTY INTO MASS PROLETARIAN PARTY

THE Open Letter of the Extraordinary Party Conference raises very sharply the problem of building the Party into a revolutionary party of the proletariat. It states that "in spite of the spread of the mass movements and, above all, in spite of the radicalization of the masses of workers, the Party has not developed into a revolutionary mass Party of the proletariat."

The influx of new elements into the Party during the past few years emphasizes the powerful attraction of the Party to the large masses of toilers. More than 35,000 workers joined the Party in the last three years.

During the past six months, our Party recruited 8,300 members. These workers joined as a result of the general activity of the Party, rather than through any special effort on the part of the Party membership. In proof of the above facts let us compare the figures of the last recruiting campaign (1932) with the recruiting during the first six months of this year.

During the 1932 three-month recruiting campaign, 6,300 workers were recruited into the Party, with a monthly average of 2,700 in the last two months of that period.

In the past six months of this year, the Party has had no special campaign, but led many successful strikes and struggles, yet reached only half the monthly average as compared with the 1932 campaign. We have not fully attained the realization that daily recruiting of the best element in struggles and activities is of vital importance.

As a crass example can be cited the Furriers Union. Under the leadership of the Party, after a victorious struggle, the Furriers Union has established itself as the only union in the industry, wiping out the reformist union and organizing 10,000 workers into its ranks. Yet, today, after more than one year's existence, the Party fraction numbers only 100.

Failure to Recruit During Strikes Weakens Proletarian Base

In going over the figures of new recruits of 1933, it is seen that only a very insignificant number were recruited from those workers involved in strikes and struggles (Detroit auto strike, Penn. miners strike, shoe and textile, metal strikes, etc), with the bulk of the workers coming from the ranks of the unemployed.

In the Detroit strike, led by the revolutionary union, we did not pay sufficient attention to recruiting into the Party and to building and strengthening the factory nuclei. In the April strikes in Pittsburgh District, only a negligible number were drawn into the Party.

The same holds true in most of the struggles during this period, with the exception of the St. Louis nutpickers' strike, where, through conscious efforts of the section leadership of the Party, they succeeded in building a Party nucleus in almost every department of the factories, building the Y.C.L. also. The Party in St. Louis, in contrast to the other districts, knew how to boldly bring forward and emphasize the role of the Party in the course of the strike.

Central Tasks of 14th Plenum not Carried Through

At the Fourteenth Plenum, the Party set itself, among others, the following task: the organization of a firm basis for our Party among the decisive strata of American workers in the most important industrial center.

Still the existing shop nuclei in the basic industry did not grow. Ninety percent of those who joined the Party were unemployed and a very small percentage of the employed workers came through direct activity in and around the factory. An analysis of the composition of the membership shows that only 3% of the members are steel workers, a little above 5% miners, not quite 3% automobile, only 1% marine, 1.3% railroad, 3% chemical; 28% of the employed members, or 7% of the entire Party membership, are working in mines and factories which employ 500 or more workers.

The tremendous fluctuation in the Party which in some concentration districts exceeded in the last period the 100% mark, took place mainly in the street nuclei. In the shop nuclei, even in those instances where we did not succeed in carrying on effective struggles, we did not lose members, but at the worst, remained stagnant, proving that organization at the point of production is more stable than on territorial basis. In the Chicago district, in spite of the unsatisfactory factory work in the past, the membership in the shop nuclei grew steadily while at the same time there was an 80% fluctuation of the membership, although militant mass unemployed struggles were carried through.

Extraordinary Conference Adopts Control Tasks to Carry Through Open Letter

At the Extraordinary Party Conference, the task was set to root the Party in the decisive elements of the working class in the basic industries. Emphasis was again placed on the necessity of concentration and the Conference concretely laid down the plan for the next period. The five concentration districts, Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, Pittsburgh and New York, were assigned the special task of concentrating on altogether about 50 factories in the steel, mining, railroad, marine, automobile, besides those specific industries and problems which the districts have (stockyard, Negro territory, etc.).

The Extraordinary Party Conference set the following control tasks:

1. To establish active Party units, drawing in the most advanced workers through personal work with them.
2. To build real mass trade union groups with functioning Party fractions in the sections.
3. To issue popular factory papers, or, for the beginning, factory bulletins.
4. To develop united front action, win the social-reformist workers and expose and fight reformism and social-fascist leaders.
5. To develop strong corps of proletarian cadres, experienced in mass work, and establish collective leadership of sections and tried secretaries in units, establish around the lower committees of the Party broad, active cadres which must be constantly instructed and utilized for the effective mobilization of the Party membership and for mass work; to draw active workers, members of the Party, from the factories into the leadership of the section committees.

Build Party into Mass Proletarian Party

Every Party member, every leading committee, imbued with the central task of building the Party into a mass Party of the American proletariat, must exert all energies toward the carrying out of this task. The Open Letter states:

"A Communist Party, with a very weak and inadequately functioning organization in the big factories and among the decisive sections of the American industrial workers, a Communist Party whose entire agitation and propaganda, whose entire daily work, is not concentrated on winning over and mobilizing these workers and winning of the factories, a Communist Party which through its revolutionary trade union work, does not build highways to the broadest masses of workers, cannot lay claim to a policy capable of making it the leader of the working class within the shortest possible time."

—J. P.

PROBLEMS OF SHOP NUCLEI

*From Speech of Wm. Schneiderman, District Organizer
of Minnesota*

I want to say a few words about one of the shop units where we have been doing some work and where, due to the fact that some concentration has been carried through, some results can be recorded, and that is the packing plant of South St. Paul. Here we assigned a comrade for work, and due to patient work over a period of months, more than a year, and the fact that this comrade had the idea that concentrating does not mean merely attending a unit meeting once a week, but participating in the activity seven days a week with the workers of that plant, he was able to build up a packing house union and organize 75 per cent of the workers in one plant and establish important contacts in a whole series of other plants in the stockyards of South St. Paul.

It would have been impossible for these comrades to make headway among these workers if they thought that building a union would mean developing only strike struggles. We at first had no conception of gaining partial demands except by striking. And this is especially important because the experiences in the 1922 packing house strike made the workers afraid of the disastrous results of a strike; they didn't believe a strike could be successful unless it was a general strike in all packing house plants.

Union Built Through Struggle for Partial Demands

But when we started to tackle the problem of raising partial demands and fighting for them, showing the workers it is possible to win them without a strike, it was possible to make headway with the union. The bosses attempted to tax the workers in the plant with a community chest tax, and when the workers mobilized and sent a delegation to the boss, saying that they would refuse to pay the tax, they won this demand. This had a tremendous effect upon the workers, showing them that it is possible to win smaller demands without endangering their jobs, without necessarily going out on strike, and to build their union side by side with this.

After this, the confidence they gained with this victory made it possible to force the rehiring of a worker fired for union activity, and finally to force the withdrawal of a threatened wage cut.

But because of the fact that the district committee has not given sufficient leadership to our comrades there, we find the shop unit in South St. Paul at the present time functioning more or less as a trade union fraction, and not as a political unit, a Communist Party unit. They hardly take up any other question than the work in the shop, the union, etc., in no sense bringing forward political issues before the workers in the shop, but functioning merely along the narrow lines of a trade union fraction, within the Packing House Workers Industrial Union. This is one reason why we have not been able to build up the Party inside this plant and in the union more than we have, because of the fact that political questions were not brought before the workers, and because our comrades considered their task was taking up the union questions and nothing else.

Must Give Daily Guidance to Shop Units

This was a comparatively good example of concentration as far as our comrades were concerned. In another shop unit, the railroad nucleus in Minneapolis, we had an experience where we assigned a leading comrade to work in the unit. His conception of concentration was to meet with the unit once a week, and the result was that after meeting with them once a week for a year, the unit has recruited one new member, has not grown, is not taking up the problems of the workers, because this comrade has this formal conception of approaching the workers in the shops.

In the———Mine, the Party and N.M.U. comrades mobilized the miners and defeated a wage cut. However, our union did not grow. Only 8-10 members among 150 miners. Our comrades did not know how to bring forward the union correctly. The result was that for a long time our comrades did not know why we were unable to recruit members for the union.

Because in the Party, and particularly among the leading cadres, there is a deep going lack of political understanding of the necessity for strengthening our basis among the decisive sections of the American workers. From this follows the fact that the leadership of the Party has not adhered to a fixed course for overcoming the main weaknesses of the Party, allows itself to be driven by events, and does not work out carefully with the comrades of the lower organizations ways and means for the carrying through of resolutions and checking up on their execution. The result is that we talk about factory and trade union work in countless resolutions, without carrying this work out.
—From Open Letter.

CHANGE METHODS OF WORK

From Speech of J. Williams, Org Secretary of Chicago District

IN the control tasks it says, "The building of the strong proletarian base of the Party in big enterprises in the main industrial centers of the country is the primary task of the whole Party." This is the central question here in relation to penetration of the shops, the building of our shop nuclei. It means, of course, that to attain this primary task we must develop and lead the economic struggles of the workers in these factories or industries we decide to concentrate upon; we must tie up all the political activities of every organization around this; we must build our unions.

400 Out of 3,000 in Shops

If we examine some of the reasons, in addition to the central reasons laid down in the Open Letter, why the concentration and penetration of the shops have not been carried through, we will find, for instance, in an examination of a registration of 3,000 Party members in the Chicago district at the beginning of the year, only a little over 400 were employed in any shop whatsoever. Now these 400 members who are in shops are our main instrument in carrying out the directives in the Open Letter. The Open Letter deals with the fact that only 5 per cent of our members are in shop nuclei. In the Chicago district, out of some 250 nuclei, only 30 are shop nuclei, comprising only 5 per cent of the membership.

I am in full agreement with the comrades who stated that in carrying out the directives of the Open Letter we must simplify our work, cut out a lot of our campaigns. When it is necessary to carry through certain major political campaigns, the directives must be of such a character that they apply to steel, to mining, to railroads—

the three main points of concentration in the Open Letter. This same practice which I refer to in the center is duplicated by the districts and in turn by the sections.

For instance, we had a situation in one section where a shoe strike of several hundred workers took place. Practically none of the leading comrades of the section in this territory was involved in the strike. Precisely because the leadership of that section was not actively involved in the strike, that leadership has very little authority with the workers in the shoe factory, and they actually do not take directives from the section leadership.

In an effort to improve this in the city of Chicago, we have tried to cut down the size of some of our sections. We have tried to build new sections around specific big plants, a stockyard section, a Western Electric section, a South Side section (which means Illinois Steel). All their work must of necessity be directed to the workers in that factory or mill, because that is all that they can find in that particular territory.

Party Face Hidden in Shop Nucleus Work

Another fact with reference to our shop nuclei. Because of our underestimation of the shop nuclei in the Chicago district we have a situation where the most elementary activity of the shop nucleus in bringing forward the face of the Party (through the shop bulletin, for example), is neglected. In our total of 30 shop nuclei, the highest number of regularly issued shop papers we ever have is ten.

Another point which needs to be emphasized is the role that the shop nucleus will play in guaranteeing our success in economic struggles. We must build the Party out of every one of these struggles. It must go hand in hand. In the St. Louis strike we recruited some 1,500 members in 12 shops for the union. And at the same time we organized six new shop nuclei. In the small shoes workers' strike in Chicago, in addition to building the union, we organized three new shop nuclei. But in the recently concluded Sopkins strike of 1,500 Negro girls in the Chicago South Side, we did not organize as yet a single Party shop nucleus and so far recruited only 18 Party members.

Main Responsibility Lies with District

Why is this so? Of course, the main general responsibility must be placed on us in the district. But it is interesting that while in the St. Louis strikes we had no old experienced forces, the leadership in the Sopkins strike included old union comrades, and it was precisely these old comrades and so-called experienced union comrades who resisted the building of the Party simultaneously with

the building of the union despite all our decisions. This is going to be a very great handicap in the consolidation of the Sopkins strike because now we go back with no recognition of our shop committees, no recognition of our union, although there were certain definite economic gains.

Must Be Ready to Lead Struggles in Steel Section

I wish now to spend a few minutes on the steel industry. It is true, comrades, that the sentiment for organization in the steel industry today has definitely changed. This is reported not only by Party members but by non-Party members. While the Industrial Recovery Bill raises all kinds of illusions, at the same time the workers, even in the steel industry, where the company union is being carried through, feel a little more free to talk than they did previously, and we must be alert and alive to take advantage of this situation. When we examine the situation in the Calument in Gary and Indiana Harbor, which are exclusively steel towns, we find that our leadership and our membership are very busy, but all of this busyness does not lead to a decisive change in penetrating the steel industry, in building the union, in building the Party.

We find in Indiana Harbor with some 50-60,000 people that our Party during the last election campaign held meetings with two and three thousand attending not only one meeting but many meetings. And in debates with the Republican Party, with the Liberty Party, with thousands present, our speakers got the greatest support and applause. The united front conference that was held around certain immediate burning issues of unemployment brought in a total of 119 organizations, of which only about 17 were under our control. And in this conference where a dispute took place as to our nominee for chairman being a Red and Communist, the Communist carried it. But in Indiana Harbor we have a Party membership of twenty.

Need a Revolution in Language Buros' Work

One problem is of great importance in steel. That is the question of our language work. In my opinion when we talk concentration, we need a revolution in our national language buros. If there is any place where we are backward, it is there. Our comrades claim that they get two sets of directives, one from the Party committees stating "your main concentration is steel," and they get other directives from the National Language Buro, which gives them something a million miles away from steel. We must overcome this. Our language press, our language resources in steel or mining where the majority are foreign-born, are an absolute prerequisite to carry through successful work.

Question to Williamson: What methods were used in the Sopkins strike in the bringing of the Party before the workers?

Answer: The methods included the following: First, those Party members who had been drawn into active leadership in the course of the strike (there were some, including, for instance, a Negro comrade who was one of the section organizers of the South Side) should not be afraid in the course of their activity to announce quite openly to the workers that as well as being active strike leaders they are also Communists. The concrete help the Communist Party gave the strike in contrast to the activities of the other political parties as represented specifically by Oscar De Priest, who is the representative of the Republican Party and dominant in the South Side, is very great. Also, of course, the issuing of leaflets by the Party and explaining our position towards the strike, our position towards the union, etc.

AUTO

From Speech of John Schmies, District Organizer of Detroit

COMRADES, in the Open Letter there is one little point which in my opinion explains everything—why the tasks set for the Party at the Fourteenth Plenum have not been carried out. Here it says: "But these tasks have not been carried out. Why? Only 4% of the members are organized in factory nuclei"—and then it says that out of the 4% which in itself is a very small percentage—only a small percentage are organized in the shop nuclei in the basic factories.

In Detroit we felt that the Fourteenth Plenum Resolution means everything it says as far as our district is concerned, that basically there was no change.

We began to discuss the situation and in connection with this some of us had the opportunity to read an article of Piatnitsky in which he described in detail the activities of a factory cell in the Bolshevik Party before the revolution. And he developed this idea, how it is possible that one Party member can begin to organize around himself a group of other workers, and, Piatnitsky goes on to say, he doesn't even have to say he is a Party member; he doesn't even have to say he is a union member, but in some cases he might even say he heard, somebody informed him, of reading a story of how workers improved their conditions in the other plant or department. And Comrade Piatnitsky explains how due to such an elementary approach of trying to explain or to ask the worker if he heard certain things in relation with the department or shop, it is possible to discuss

the problem in the particular department, too. So, by making contact with a friend, with whatever means they, as Party members, had, they succeeded in organizing a department strike and made out of this department strike a general strike in the factory. They were even able to create a strike wave in one city, which resulted in many cases in developing a general strike in the city. The militancy of the workers was directed into street demonstrations, thereby immediately connecting up the political struggle with the very elementary economic struggle that started in that particular department.

Detroit Strikes—Direct Result of Shop Work

How did we organize the strike in Detroit? In one case we had one comrade in a department. Now this one comrade couldn't organize the department. He had to make a contact first and he had to find some workers who were willing to fight for better conditions. So we have the experience that through one comrade we succeeded in organizing shop groups and later on the struggle was developed. And then we had the experience where we had 3, 4, and 5 comrades whom we organized into a nucleus and then the problems of the shop were taken up.

The building of shop nuclei, recruiting members into the Party, will be a tremendous political factor in breaking down the idea that the Communists or revolutionary unions work from the "outside." If our nucleus gains the leadership of this movement and if this Communist nucleus explains the role of the Party, and of the unions, the workers in that factory will not look at the Party and the union as outsiders.

Wherever we made an attempt and succeeded in organizing two or three Party nuclei, we have the union to a certain extent established, and where we have more or less a strong nucleus as the result of the strike, we have a situation where the workers themselves under the auspices of the union have issued two leaflets, one against the New Deal, and one against the A. F. of L. There we can see the initiative from below.

Cannot Do Real Shop Work Without Party

The next question: did we assign what we call concentration groups from the outside, or did we first see what we have in the factory and begin to concentrate on the forces in the factory? We merely assigned, as far as outside forces are concerned, leading comrades to some of the shops.

In addition, of course, we mobilized the sections around these two concentration points and here I may add is where the biggest mistake was made in the sense that, for instance, the section organizer and the active members in the Section Committee got so interest-

ed in these organizing groups that they forgot all about calling the Section Party Committee together or taking care of the section. In fact the section organizer did finally call a section membership meeting together after pressure, but he was absent. He said he had to meet three workers in the restaurant at 10 o'clock in the evening. This is excellent. But to this we must add the question of how is it possible for this section organizer and how it is possible for us to direct and help him so that these 5 workers will be taken care of in such a way that all members in this particular section have as their task to get 3 or 5 workers together.

Lack of Faith in Local Leadership Greatest Mistake

One more point is very important for us.

The strike developed in one of the B—— plants, and then in another plant. So we rushed over to the other plant and settled this very fast. And while we were doing this, another strike broke out, and we rushed over there. By the time we were through we were at the head of all this movement, but finally we looked around and we couldn't see anybody around us.

What is the lesson? Why didn't we organize a group of comrades in the first strike? Why didn't we make them the leaders and say to the section: here is your new group, here is where you have to work—and distribute the forces on the other strike. We did not lack forces; these new Party comrades who organized the first and second strikes, why didn't we make them leaders of this movement—that is the real Bolshevik criticism. They started the strike, and we forgot all about them; they were the real leaders of this strike. We led all these strikes and were responsible for organizing them, but we did not create anything in the center that would keep around us these hundreds and thousands of workers.

If we can settle down and continue this Bolshevik point of concentration, organize the Party, organize the fractions in the union, have these workers that can control the situation, make them feel we believe in them, have confidence in them, and are with them every day, then the Party will grow.

BUILDING PARTY DURING STRIKES

From Speech of a Leading Comrade of Auto Workers Union

WE have just had a convention of the Auto Workers Union where 110 delegates were present, half of whom actually represented workers from the shops. The big majority of these delegates had had strike experiences this year. Many of them had

initiated the organization of little groups in the shops that preceded these strikes. The number of workers represented was in the neighborhood of 45,000.

We have to record the fact that we were not able to keep all who came into the union during and as a result of the strikes. Also at the convention there were very few Negro workers and practically no women from the shops. The main reason, of course, is the fact that we failed to carry on the day-to-day struggles that were necessary after the strike was over, especially in behalf of the laid-off workers.

It was mainly because of the fact that we failed to develop struggle in defense of the leading elements in the union that a dwindling of the membership took place. And probably the most important fact is our failure to build up shop nuclei in these factories to get in members in the Party during the strike. This resulted in weakening our resistance to the company agents, to the elements that are utilizing the red scare. After the strike it became almost impossible to combat the various schemes to sow dissension in the union without a strong nucleus of the Party.

Our Clumsy Methods Antagonize Workers

It is not true that workers have got any antagonisms towards the "reds." It is more often because of our clumsy methods in carrying on work, in carrying out some of the program, that we antagonize workers—methods that make it seem to non-Party workers that we take an attitude that we are the Communists, that the union is ours, and that we can do anything we want with it.

At the convention there were quite a few instances brought up where we had carried on the day-to-day struggles, and in such shops we maintained the organization more or less.

In the—plant we carried on a few struggles after the strike and one struggle resulted in increase in the wages of the workers.

Another struggle in which we had a united front with the—union, resulted in an increase of from 52 to 90 cents an hour.

At the convention there was a delegate from the—who reported a struggle in that plant which involved the stopping of work of several hundred workers who remained in the plant until a 10 percent increase was granted.

However, we have only a few instances which demonstrate our ability to carry on the every-day struggles against victimization, against lay-offs, for unemployment relief which is the cause of quite a number of members leaving the organization.

Failure to Hold Union Meetings During Strike Fatal Mistake

During the strikes, I have to report the fact that in the—plant, for instance, where we had a struggle against the company agents, we had a local even before the strike took place. But during the strike itself, we forgot even to call this local together, which meant, of course, that our enemies were organized while we were not. They carried on every-day activities among the workers. And we were trying to fight against them from the top. We did not even try to call together the Party members employed in the plant. This, of course, is one of the main reasons for the committing of a number of mistakes in the plant.

Must Find Methods to Protect Employed Workers

One year ago, we had a group of some fifty workers in the—plant. This group was disrupted, the majority of the workers were fired and suspicion was laid against a certain individual. At the beginning of the year we began to reorganize once more. The group was disrupted, about a dozen comrades were fired out of the plant, and suspicion is against the same individual. Just before I left Detroit, several comrades came to me, feeling that they were getting absolutely no direction in carrying out work in their shop nucleus, feeling they do not dare inform the leading comrades when they get a job in the shop.

I think it is about high time we began to examine this work more carefully and find out whether or not we are using the best methods to protect the workers employed. To show the spirit of the workers, since that time we have organized three different groups in the———plant. This time we are not putting them all together, and we are trying to make connections between these groups not by bringing them together in one local, but through a system of representatives from each of the departments.

Leading Bodies Must Help Members of Shop Units

We assume in carrying on the work in the shops that every comrade is born with the knowledge of how to carry on the work. This is not so. Some comrades have the ability of attracting the workers around them, of really being leaders inside the shops. Other comrades, even though sincere, antagonize the workers because they are in the habit of telling the workers they are wrong every time they make a statement. Some comrades even make themselves a pest. When the workers call them a Bolshevik, instead of the term meaning a militant worker, it has the meaning of someone who makes himself a nuisance.

It is about time that the District and National leadership began to take up some of these problems of carrying on the work in the shop. I find that a good beginning is often made in the shop work and then some of the key comrades are taken out to prepare for a demonstration. These comrades are taken out and the beginning is left to go to the dogs. Comrades assigned to shop work should be allowed to concentrate all their attention on this work, and even when a demonstration is being arranged, and this comrade can bring ten workers or so to the demonstration from that shop, he is doing a big part of the work. If we take this attitude, maybe the demonstration will be less, but I am inclined to think they will be bigger and better demonstrations because they will actually involve workers in the shops. I think the demonstration such as the comrades had in the———plant is a very important demonstration. Proper activity of the shop nuclei can raise such demonstrations to a higher political level.

WAR INDUSTRIES

Talk about the defense of the Soviet Union and struggle against imperialist war is nothing but empty phrases unless systematic work is carried out in the war industry plants and in the ports.—From the Open Letter.

From Speech of Leading Shop Nucleus Member

I come from a nucleus situated in the New York district. In order for the comrades to understand some of the problems which I raise in connection with this shop it is necessary that they understand the type of shop. Three thousand eight hundred workers work in the shop, among them one hundred young fellows—apprentices. This plant produces only war materials.

There are twenty-one trades in this shop and ten locals of the American Federation of Labor in the plant, among them machinists, sheet metal, plumbers, and other numerous locals of the A.F. of L. of this type. We have a shop nucleus of five comrades. All of them are young comrades, members of the Y.C.L. We also have an opposition group in the machinist local and an apprentice association. This apprentice association has a history which I will try to give in brief.

Hold Shop Meeting during Work

Some fellows in this shop decided that in order to get their conditions bettered they were going to form an organization. When the officials heard of this, they called a special meeting of the entire

group of one hundred young fellows during working hours. For about four hours they tried to get this group of apprentices into an organization that would visit other shops of similar nature and while visiting these shops look over the methods of production, and so make better mechanics out of the apprentices. The response of the apprentices to this proposal was: "We are not interested in visiting these other plants, we are interested in having an organization and getting something for ourselves."

With the help of the comrades inside the shop we finally built an organization that says definitely in the constitution that its main purpose is to better the conditions of the apprentices. Through our work and by getting very friendly with these fellows we managed to elect one of our comrades as secretary and another comrade as shop delegate of this organization. We had a system of shop delegates from each shop represented in a central organization which has three or four officers.

Organize Against Wage Reduction

The first act of this organization was in connection with a fifteen percent wage cut which came through the plant at the same time that the automatic raises of the apprentices were taken away. The apprentices are given raises every year and at the end of four years they are supposed to be made mechanics and get mechanic's pay. Among these apprentices there were many who had finished their four years' apprenticeship and were still working as apprentices.

We drew up a petition and most of the apprentices signed it. In this petition we stated that we oppose this fifteen percent cut, especially with the low wages which these young workers were getting. At the same time we pointed out that not making these apprentices full-fledged mechanics also affected the standard of the mechanics.

The second act of this organization was to organize a paper to deal with the conditions of the fellows in the plant, to be distributed to them inside the plant, to the adult workers, and also outside the plant, in order to mobilize popular opinion.

We Carry Activities to Other Plants

Third, we decided to gain more strength. Throughout the country there are other plants of this nature which also have apprentices. We decided that we were going to build a national association of apprentices. So we began to send letters to different shops of the same type. To date we have received answers from many shops throughout the country and probably within the year we will have started this national association.

Let me point out how we were able to do some of these things. First of all, we could not have done anything without the nucleus inside the organization, working at every meeting and actually acting as the leader of the organization.

We had a peculiar problem in the shop—there are 3,700 adult workers and 100 youths. Our entire force of comrades were among the youth, not the main section of these workers, so we had the problem of penetrating the ranks of the adult workers in the A.F. of L.; any struggle inside the shop would not be among the apprentices, but would take the form of a struggle among the adults.

We Have to Deal with Delicate Questions

Since we had to get to these mechanics, we came up against the following problem: Although more developed politically than the average worker because of long experience in the A.F. of L. and labor movement—many of them so far back as the eight hour day strike in 1918—these workers depend upon building these war materials for their livelihood. It was necessary for us to deal with some very delicate questions.

First, we had to explain our proposal in connection with all war funds to the unemployed; second, defense of the Soviet Union; third, the question of what they can do. We decided to issue six leaflets through the shop, dealing with all these questions, pointing out in detail what this shop was producing, and how these workers, although unconsciously, were helping to prepare for a new world war. With these six leaflets, we expect to clarify the workers to some extent on some of the basic questions.

Second, we had to penetrate the A.F. of L. We started in the strongest local, where we had sympathetic workers, and organized a group consisting of fifteen members of the machinist local. We had meetings with them and discussed the problems inside the A.F. of L. local and how to fight for certain proposals against the officials.

We Make Mistakes—Fail to Build Y.C.L.

We have made some mistakes: first, and most serious, all our League members were in the League before they got into the shop. We haven't recruited a single League member. Among these apprentices we have some valuable contacts, we have fellows who could do systematic work and whom we should draw in; we have not done it. We haven't penetrated the A.F. of L. to any extent. Our work in connection with the one local has fallen down, there is no work being done at the present time.

Second, the question of safeguarding *members*. We drew up a

letter to a nucleus in the Soviet Union that works in the same type of plant we have. We drew up the letter and sent it to the comrade in charge of International Correspondence and *this letter, in its entirety, dealing with where we had our organization, where all of us were concerned, what our tasks were, everything was printed in the Daily Worker—the entire thing*, and the next day in the apprentice school in this shop the teacher delivered a lecture for an hour and a half on the question of our work in the shop. To this date, none of us has been fired out of the shop, but whether this is because we aren't troubling them or whether they don't know of us, I can't say. But certainly we have to develop much better methods of safeguarding our members inside of these nuclei.

WORK AMONG GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

From Speech by Leading Member of Shop Nucleus

ABOUT a year ago there were three comrades in my shop; we are government employees. There were practically no militant rank and file workers nor any mass organization. Just about a year ago, the workers in my place got a wage cut. Immediately a few workers got out a petition against the cut. In the process of fighting against the cut we built up a rank and file organization, and today we have 1,800 or 2,000 workers in that particular organization.

The work of this group of new comrades was good. They started out by building committees. Our industry is so situated that we had to recruit workers and today in this particular craft we have influence and control of the 15,000-23,000 workers all told. During this time we were doing recruiting and we have today 23 comrades. In the process of working in this mass organization and in the shop we realized that the only way we could carry out the Party line and build the organization, was to build T.U.U.L. groups, that is, not actually having T.U.U.L. books. We built up informal groups. The fellows got together, held discussions and fought as the left wing in the organization and on the job.

Organize Shop Committees and Groups

Our young comrades had to find a method of work that would enable us to bring these workers into the organization. Being government employees, these workers had many illusions. They

believed they could not strike, etc. Under great hardships we were able to organize on the basis of shop committees and shop groups in every department.

I think it is the first time in the history of this particular trade where the workers actually went out in a demonstration. This first demonstration is the beginning of a movement that will grow throughout the entire country. We have gotten out a magazine that today has a circulation of 5,000. We have also gotten out pamphlets attacking the wage cuts.

In the shop there are many trade unions, quite a few of them built on craft lines. Some of them are affiliated with the A. F. of L. The A.F. of L. has little or no influence in the shop although getting dues from 30 per cent of them. The workers belong not because it's a union that does something for them but because of the sick and death benefits. These workers are beginning to demand something concrete. They demand action.

Work towards Establishment of Industrial Union

The workers are looking to our young rank and file organization and soon it will be possible to convert it into an industrial union, taking in all crafts and start working among all of them. We have been able to talk to the workers in the other trades in this particular shop and show them that they must organize. They asked us to come in and organize them. We told them this was not the way. We told them, "you yourselves must form your committees, get out petitions and get into struggle. We will work with you, help you and will actually take leadership whenever necessary, but we cannot build your organization for you."

No Fluctuation in Shop Recruitment

In the beginning we were able to recruit the comrades very slowly. One or two comrades got in one or two others. We began building little groups and recruiting them into the left opposition groups and directly into the Party, and today we have 23 comrades. These 23 are rapidly recruiting others, at the rate of one and two a week. We have had no fluctuation at all. Since the very beginning we have had only one comrade transferred and that was because he left the place of work. The others have remained in the Party and have been developed. They are only four, six and eight months in the Party and today they are the leaders in the mass organizations and carry on Party work.

VETERANS' MOVEMENT

The Party is now faced with the task of organizing the united struggle of the American workers and all toiling masses for their vital immediate demands. This includes the organization of the struggle against the reduction of veterans' disability allowances and for the payment of the bonus.—From the Open Letter.

Excerpts from Speech of James W. Ford, Member of Polburo Communist Party of U.S.A.

THE PolBuro of the Party has seen it necessary to put on the agenda of this Conference the question of the veterans.

I want here to emphasize the need for a political understanding of the necessity of strengthening our base among the veterans, the various veteran organizations and also to build the W. E. S. L.

What is the significance and importance of the veterans' movement and the work among the veterans in this country? (1) Everybody knows and has seen that the movement was more or less but not altogether spontaneous. It has been a broad movement of a nation-wide character of great sections of the American population, workers, poor farmers, etc. (2) This movement can be seen as an instrument for fascist development against the working class. The bourgeoisie quite well understands the possibility of utilizing this movement against the working class, and herein lies the importance of work among the vets.

On the other hand the lessons of this movement are that with the bankruptcy of the Roosevelt Recovery Act, the bourgeoisie will attempt to utilize this movement as a fascist movement against the workers. We are in a favorable position today not only to *prevent* the use of this movement as a fascist movement against the working class *but to get support of the movement for the working class.*

What is this movement? It is composed of advanced elements of the working class, backward workers, clerks, doctors, lawyers, a whole cross section of the population, including both Negro and white. In this movement also are a number of Spanish-American War and Foreign War Veterans. Some comrades view these veterans as "fascists."

Wrong to Brand Veterans as Fascists

But, comrades, I think this is incorrect, as many comrades do, to view this movement as a whole as a fascist movement. Certainly we have found in the course of this movement in 1932 and also this year that there are fascist leaders, agents of the government

in the movement, but to characterize this whole movement as a fascist movement and therefore to ignore it, is incorrect.

Comrade Browder has pointed out the cut in the disability allowance. There was a cut in the soldier's pay, the establishment of forced labor camps.

Comrade Browder also pointed out that it is the same with the Roosevelt administration as with the Hoover administration, but Roosevelt dealt more deceitfully with the veterans.

Now with regards to the question of the returning of the disability allowance. We want to establish here the idea that the disability allowance of the ex-servicemen is a form of *social insurance* for the veterans. On this we will be able to have an idea of the changes on the whole question of Social and Unemployment Insurance.

Develop Anti-War Activities through Vets

Another question is the question of the anti-war activity which can be developed—anti-war sentiment and struggles among ex-soldiers who fought for the government. The most important thing I want to emphasize is the question of what can be done. How can we guarantee that every District Organizer, every Party comrade will develop and organize the movement among the ex-servicemen?

We have laid down a program for developing local struggles around the local relief stations. To develop the movements of the veterans in the neighborhoods for local relief, around veterans' bureaus, in every city, around state legislatures, in the congressional centers of the congressmen who are in Washington, for the enforcement of legislation which has been passed in many states for relief to the veterans.

The New York State legislature, for example, has passed special laws for relief to the veterans which are not being enforced for the benefit of the veterans. We must develop a broad united front movement to break into the American Legion, into the Spanish-American War Veterans organization and to build up a united front of all these veterans in the neighborhoods and locals to struggle for local relief.

Build Rank and File Movement around Demands

In my opinion these points are: 1. Local relief. 2. Special relief to the veterans. 3. Fight against discrimination in any of the relief stations where veterans are discriminated against. 4. Special medical attention and aid to the veterans in various hospitals. This can only be done by day-to-day systematic work. Here I want to draw attention to the methods of work shown in the report made here by the

young girl comrade yesterday, how she analyzed the day-to-day work done in the dress factory. We will be able, if we apply this to the veterans' movement to go into the posts of the American Legion and by patient day-to-day work win them for struggle and unity.

Build up *central rank and file committees* on the basis of a fight for the demands that I outlined. We should be able to establish for the most important districts in the Party a quota that they shall get in direct contact with a certain number of veterans, say 100-200 veterans and to continue to work upon these contacts. Districts like New York, Chicago and Detroit should see that the comrades establish such quotas.

Party Concentration Lays Basis for N.T.W.I.U. Lead in Strike

I want to take up another question, the question with regard to strike struggles, especially the struggles in St. Louis and Chicago. Here we have a concrete example of how we can by systematic work develop strike struggle. Comrade Gebert has spoken about the St. Louis strike of Negro women. In Chicago they have shown us how to concentrate, they began a year ago. Through activities of women's work in South Side section, Negro women workers were contacted. The contacts were given to the Needle Trades Workers Industrial Union and the Union began to organize these. They took them out on strike and these strikes are in my opinion two of the most important, two of the most historic strikes that have occurred among Negroes.

I shall not have the time to go into the details of how the strike committee worked, how they organized their fight, how we were able to get the whole sentiment of Chicago in spite of the police and the employers. We were able to get support among the churches. We can learn from Chicago how to develop the trade union organization among the Negroes. I think these strikes are important lessons for Harlem.

I want to agree with how the Open Letter characterizes the importance of the Negro work. It says: "The other important ally of the American proletariat is to be found in the masses of Negroes in the struggle against national oppression." The Communist Party is the only Party that can lead this struggle of the Negro masses. In Harlem I believe we have great possibilities for developing this movement among the Negroes, and I believe the St. Louis and Chicago strikes show us how, on the basis of developing economic struggles of the Negroes we can find and develop the Negro cadres for such a movement.

Negro Comrades Must Secure Confidence of Negro Masses for Our Party

We must understand what the Letter says: "The Party, and in the first place the Negro comrades, must genuinely improve the methods of patient, systematic but persistent struggle against the ideology and influences of petty bourgeois nationalism among the Negro workers." This makes it the first duty of the Negro comrades to create confidence among the Negro masses in the Party and the Central Committee and the Polburo. I do not think there is sufficient of this work done by the leading Negro comrades now.

Comrade Kuusinen once said that it is the task of the white comrades to fight every remnant of white chauvinism and on the other hand the task of every Negro comrade to gain the confidence of the Negro masses for our Party and not to destroy it, and this is in line with fighting Negro nationalist bourgeois ideology.

I want to further agree with the remarks made by Comrade Browder, and Heywood will further emphasize this, that the L.S.N.R. must be built and such an organization is needed for the development of the liberation struggle, and I think this Conference should take some definite action on the L.S.N.R. and how we can bring this Open Letter into the struggle of the veterans, into the Negro liberation movement.

PENETRATE ARMED FORCES

*From Speech by Leading Comrade of Workers
Ex-Servicemen's League*

ON the question of the struggle for relief and unemployment insurance, five million of the population, the veterans, which represent according to the figures of the bourgeoisie ten per cent of the electorate—with their families twenty per cent—citizens, the native sections of America today, have lost their social insurance. This has been taken from them directly by the government in the New Deal. The Economy Bill changed the entire policy on Veteran Pensions. That has not moved us a bit in the past year. In spite of the fact that the Party has had a line and orientation, the documents have pointed out that these things are happening.

Let me give a few examples of concrete work, examples of co-ordination of work of the Ex-Servicemen's League with some of our major tasks. In the trade unions, say in the A. F. of L., the "Big Six" (Printing Trade) Post of the Veterans of Foreign Wars

sent a protest against the use of troops against the veterans. In every one of the unions there are sections of the American Legion, of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Comrades, on the question of the Veterans Relief, on the question of their back pay—the bonus—certainly we can easily bring these questions up in these unions.

Through Vets' Movement Can Penetrate Armed Forces

I could give details on the struggle against war, the co-ordinating of this so that we will reach the armed forces. And when I say veterans I don't mean only those who went to war. We have to make a change in the leadership in the Veterans' movement. We must put forward the World War veterans, but remember the peacetime veterans. They get a certain insurance also, and these are some of the best contacts, fresh from the armed forces to make contact with the men in the armed forces today.

Right here in New York City, after sending veterans to Washington, the United Front Committee, a group led by the Socialist Party, split the ranks of the veterans led by the renegades against the Party. Within a few weeks' time the rank and file of the veterans repudiated those methods and those active in the leadership of it are the ones now active in repudiating the S.P., are exposing their making this attempt and trying to bribe them.

Sectarianism in Veterans' Movement

In the Ex-Servicemen's League, the veterans feel that unless they have a red card of some kind they can't join the Workers' Ex-Servicemen's League. A narrow, sectarian tendency that reflects our sectarian tendency throughout the entire Party. That must be seriously and sharply stopped. And we will be able to carry it out only if we study this problem.

The mass pressure of the veterans today has turned away the fight from bourgeois control and we are able on our three-point program to bring the question closer to the unemployed and with the farmer. This kind of a movement has been started; unity of veterans with the general mass struggles. We must carry out the line of the Open Letter for winning over large sections of native American elements. Building up of the veteran movement and its proper co-ordination with our basic tasks will be one of the methods to carry out the intent of the Open Letter.

TEXTILE

Excerpts from Speech of Leading Comrade in Trade Union Work

ABOUT the Salem strike. What is the importance of this one strike of some 1800 workers, organized one hundred percent in the U.T.W.? First, this has become a strike against the Recovery Act. It shows—recovery bill or no recovery bill—the workers will fight for improved conditions. Secondly, it shows that even where the A.F. of L. has its best organization the workers will fight and will follow our leadership if we know how to get to them.

There is one example of how to carry on a correct policy in such a difficult situation. How did our comrades get into the Salem strike? We had no one there, no Party or T.U.U.L. member. Our organizer, Comrade ———, went down there. She found the workers were willing to fight. The workers elected their own committee, did not trust the officials who came out against the strike. The comrade did not come down there denouncing everybody and just say: join our union, something which we did in the past but with no success. The comrade began to talk to individual workers, began to get acquainted with some of the members of the Strike Committee, did not denounce these workers as misleaders but tried to find out who they were. She began to give them concrete advice and won their confidence by showing them how to defeat a plan of the company and the A.F. of L. to drive the workers back to work and to victimize them by making them vote with marked ballots. Our comrade gained a lot of prestige among the workers through helping them with the relief machinery, by giving them concrete assistance to win their economic demands.

I think, comrades, this strike is a great lesson to us, the militancy of the workers, the confidence in their own Party, the ability to get the workers to follow our class-struggle policy. (Since that time the strikers won their demands and unanimously seceded from the A.F. of L.,—organizing an independent union, the Textile Workers Union, by carrying through the above correct policy and by leading textile workers in strikes the Slavery Code—recruited over 1,500 members in the Union in the last month.)

CORRECT PAST METHODS OF WORK

From Speech of A. Davis, Org Secretary of Philadelphia District

COMRADES, just a few words on our concentration in Allentown. In the Open Letter the situation in Allentown is given as an example of the wrong method of work. In the struggle of 1931 we were successful in discrediting the United Textile Workers Union in Allentown. But when the strike was over, we packed our bags and cleared out of the city of Allentown. The workers did not see us for two years, until the Amalgamated entered Allentown and began leading strikes in the shirt shops. The girls were working for \$4 a week. They settled the strike, gaining a 10 per cent increase. But actually the gain didn't amount to anything, since they had to pay 25 cents dues to the union every week.

We Concentrate in Allentown

Our comrades began to react to the problem. We sent comrades in and began concentration in Allentown. What happened? The U.T.W. decided to call a meeting. We discussed the problem and we felt that it was necessary for us to take the initiative. With hard work we succeeded in having the best meeting of silk workers held in Allentown since 1931. The meeting was called by the National Textile Union and there were about 200 workers present representing 17 shops. We proposed to the workers the organization of mutual committees on the basis of a united front of National Textile Workers and U.T.W. members.

On the basis of this conference we decided to begin immediately a campaign of struggle in some of the mills in Allentown. The bosses, feeling the growth of our organization, began a system of voluntary raises of 10 and 15 percent to the workers. We decided to concentrate on one mill where conditions were especially bad, where there were no clocks to measure the amount of silk produced and workers' wages were stolen doubly. In a period of a week one of the mills in that city went on strike and in this strike a worker who had come in contact with our movement through listening to speeches at Union Square, etc., became a leader of the strike.

Workers Want Independent Union

Our comrades began to speak about organizing revolutionary unions and bringing forward the N.T.W.U. What was the reaction of the workers? They felt that the N.T.W.U. was a militant union, an honest union, but were not convinced that it could win better conditions for them; the workers felt that if they developed their own independent union among the Allentown silk workers they could win better conditions.

It is my opinion that we must bring forward before these workers our revolutionary trade unions and the need for building these unions. At the same time, however, we must not make a fetish of this. If the workers insist upon organizing an independent union on a mass scale, in which we can provide leadership and do active work, I do not think we can place the question of the name of the union against mass organization of the workers. At the same time it is important for us to bring forward our own revolutionary unions and urge workers to join, particularly because there is a tendency in many sections, due to the Industrial Recovery Bill, to negate the role of the revolutionary trade union and to take short cuts to independent unions.

CONCENTRATION IN LAWRENCE

From Speech of a Leading Member of National Textile Workers Union

IN Lawrence, which is the concentration point for the textile industry, we have seen the correction of one mistake, that of shifting around the leadership and have had continuous leadership for one year. The Open Letter nevertheless applies to us with full force.

The National Textile Workers Union has mass influence in Lawrence and the Party is known to the workers, as a result particularly of the effective campaign we conducted against night work for women. Both the union and the Party have led and conducted small struggles for unemployed relief. For more than a year now the workers of Lawrence have seen a N.T.W.U. on the job continuously and appreciate the fact that it is the only organization in the field fighting for their interests.

There are many reasons for this but the basic one is to be found in the fact that we have not yet succeeded in convincing the workers that the union is not an organization that you join only when you go on strike. Having suffered defeat in the 1931 strike the workers are very reluctant at present to join the union.

This of course is due in large measure to our mistakes in the past. But we have learned. For instance, during the strike wave that spread in the textile centers a few weeks ago and especially following the strike in the Amoskeag Mill in Manchester there was a very definite strike sentiment in Lawrence. The mill owners sensed it perhaps better than we did. They are in the mills with the workers day in and day out and often know the moods of the workers better than we do. The result was that they announced a 12½ percent

wage increase the very week that we were preparing for an intensive campaign to stimulate a struggle in Lawrence.

We did not make the mistake we might have made in the past; namely, to denounce this increase as nothing at all and calling upon the workers to strike for more. We decided instead to test out the reaction of the workers and found they were not ready to strike for a greater increase.

We called a mass meeting for which we carried out a very good preparation. Utilizing the strikes in the nearby New England centers we invited the workers and announced that strikers from the Amoskeag, Dover and Salem strikes would report. Nevertheless, although we did not talk about the strike in Lawrence in our leaflets or preparations for the meeting, only 50 workers turned out. This was our answer. The workers understood the significance of the meeting. Their answer showed they were not in a strike mood.

Workers Ready to Fight for Partial Demands

Analyzing this we might have drawn the conclusion that this indicated a no-struggle perspective. This would have been a mistake for in that very week numerous department struggles were carried out by the workers on department grievances, such as demand for lunch periods, no overtime, against speed-up, etc. This gave us our line. We have to find a way to convince the workers of our sincerity and ability to protect their jobs while winning immediate improvements. We hammered out a system for providing leadership through department leaflets. In one mill, the Arlington, which was a particularly backward mill during the October strike, we succeeded in this manner in winning a lunch period and stopping overtime for from 400 to 1,000 workers, which is something to the credit of the union and of great benefit to the workers. Our leaflets were simple.

For instance, where the company tried to steal the lunch hour which the workers had won about a month earlier with our help, we called upon them: *when lunch time comes walk out as usual, no arguments necessary, everybody will do it.* The leaflet reached all the workers in the department. They were filled with confidence and actually walked out as we had directed. When the management called for the leaders, a representative committee, they were told there aren't any. When the superintendent attempted to intimidate some workers by demanding to know why they had stopped the workers answered: "Everybody stopped, so I did too." The demand was won and no one was fired.

This is our work: to win one small department struggle after another for the workers without their resulting in discrimination so that they can learn from actual experience what the union stands for.

MUST CONCENTRATE ON BASIC SHOPS

From Speech of Rebecca Grecht, District Organizer of New Jersey

ON page 4 of the Open Letter it is stated, first, that there is a deep-going lack of political understanding of the necessity of strengthening ourselves among the decisive sections of the American masses, and then it says, "From this follows the fact that the leadership of the Party has not adhered to a fixed course for overcoming the main weaknesses of the Party and allows itself to be swayed by the drift of events." This is the very heart and crux of our failure to do concentration work. We do not follow a fixed course. When we decide on a specific factory concentration, on a specific neighborhood concentration, we find in the midst of it that a hundred and one other things arise that for the moment appear more important.

We have far too much the tendency to look for the spectacular, to look for the big things, the things that can produce immediate results, and not to base ourselves sufficiently on that kind of day-to-day, concentrated activity which brings fundamental results, even though these are not so quickly apparent.

I know how it has been in District 14. We have had in our experience precisely this—that had we followed a fixed course in concentration work without permitting ourselves to be moved by every current happening, and events that arose, we would today be able to report far many more strikes, far many more new nuclei in shops of basic industry.

In the last six or seven months, there have been in the Paterson section at least 30 to 40 shop strikes, many of them under the leadership of the National Textile Workers Union. However, what happened there? In spite of the fact that these struggles have succeeded to a certain extent in breaking the wall that existed last year between the union and the masses, one fundamental problem has arisen, and this is, the necessity of concentration on a number of basic shops—silk, dyeing and woolen mills. This was resisted. Why? Because in all of these little silk shops of fifteen or sixteen workers it is much simpler to carry on the work, results are seen much more rapidly. When it came to the dye houses, of two or three thousand workers, that meant much more patient and persistent work. For six months we have been driving and driving away on this question, and it is only now at this moment that we can at least report that precisely because of the beginning of concentration work, we have established a shop nucleus in one of the largest silk dye plants in the country employing about three thousand workers. Only now the comrades are becoming convinced that we can continue to concentrate more basically on this plant.

OPPOSITION WORK IN F.F.H.W.U.

From Speech of Leading Member of Textile Workers Union

THE Full Fashioned Hosiery Workers Union has become famous for its wage cuts. At one time we were the best paid workers in the United States. Wages of \$80 and \$90 for a forty hour week were nothing unusual. At one time the whole industry was organized and we were considered the aristocracy of labor. Today the picture is different. Statistics of the United States Department of Labor show that average wages have fallen to \$17 for skilled men and to \$10 and \$11 for skilled girls. We have taken more wage cuts than any other skilled trade in the United States. Of the 10,000 organized workers in the city of Philadelphia, 94 percent are unemployed. The conditions of the hosiery workers are deplorable. Despite this, we became a battle ground of social reformism in the United States.

Build Fractions in F.F.H.W.U.

Today we have a Party fraction of about 12 Party members in the local union in Philadelphia, and some sympathizers in other local unions. But we have built up a Party fraction in the last year of ten members in the biggest local union, which is good when we consider the fact that a year ago we had only one Party member in that particular union.

The full fashioned hosiery industry is composed mainly of young, native born American elements, and our Party members are, with one exception, native born Americans. Lately some of them have come forward actively in the leadership of our District. Thus one is section organizer of an important section in Philadelphia and another is district *Daily Worker* agent.

Opposition Work Forces Referendum

Now on our work in the union and the struggle we have carried on. About three or four weeks ago, the National Executive Committee of the Full Fashioned Hosiery Workers Union met, adopted a motion to do away with the constitution, and elected a sub-committee of five with the right to negotiate any wage cut that seems fit in order that the union shops may be in position to compete with the non-union section of the industry. We immediately began a struggle, and forced the union officials to carry through a referendum. The workers in Philadelphia were called to this referendum. The biggest meeting ever held in the history of the union took place in Kensington Labor Lyceum. About 1,400 workers came out. The Party fraction had met and discussed the question very thoroughly

with the District leadership. The action decided upon was that when the meeting was opened, one of our speakers would ask for the floor, oppose the wage cut, and call upon the workers to declare a general strike. At the meeting the workers responded with tremendous applause for our speaker. After our speaker got down, a rank and file worker got up and said they don't want to listen to any official that put through the wage cut, and therefore he moved the previous question. The machine tried to speak, but they were booed down and none of them could speak. The vote was 963 against, and 287 for the wage cut. This was the first time that we ever actually defeated the machine on the union floor.

F.F.H.W.U. Leaders Betray Workers

What did the machine do? It immediately started propaganda in two of the biggest union shops, the Hancock mill and the Aberly mill. The union officials made a proposal to call a general strike in the open shop. Our fraction immediately raised the proposal of a general strike in the entire industry, not only in the open shop. Many of you comrades have read and heard of what happened the evening before the general strike was called; how 1,300 workers showed up at the meeting to make preparations. The meeting did not adjourn until 4:30. I have seen the famous telegram of Perkins which asked the leaders of the F.F.H.W.U. to call off the strike. And the leaders, without consulting the workers, called off the strike at the request of the U.S. government.

Next I will deal with the strike in Reading. How a general flare-up exists in the county. The Full Fashioned Hosiery Workers Union prepared for weeks and weeks for the Industrial Recovery Bill. They put out a leaflet which read: "Roosevelt has done his share, now you workers do yours; join the union; without joining the union you will be lost in the Industrial Recovery Bill." And let me assure you comrades, the American Federation of Full Fashioned Hosiery Workers, which has a membership of approximately 18,000 to 20,000, has recruited ten to fifteen thousand workers in the last few weeks. Every mill in Reading is tied up, every mill in the small town of Boylton is out on strike. Eighty percent of the hosiery made in the United States is made in this particular section of the country, and every mill there is tied up.

Workers Militantly Defend Their Interests

Simultaneously with the movement of the F.F.H.W.U. the Amalgamated Clothing Workers came into the situation. There were thousands of workers on the highway, there was actually a general strike, and our Party was not in the picture, our Party did

not know about it. In Reading that same night, the workers everywhere marched through the city streets with bands marked "Strikers."

Everyone knows the Pennsylvania Dutch, how conservative they are, and how in 1931 picket lines of thousands of workers could not stop them from going to work. And now there is the most enthusiastic picket line. On one day about 5,000 young American workers blocked the roads to the mill so completely that nobody could get near the mill. They recruited almost 480 members on the spot, right on the picket line; tied up the biggest open shop in the textile industry, a shop that has the most scientific spy system.

One of our fraction members in the F.F.H.W.U. hit the nail on the head, I think, when he said that the American workers believe in the impartiality of the state, and now they have the idea that this great impartial man, Roosevelt, sitting in Washington, D. C., is going to arbitrate all the conflicts of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. This is where our struggle must start. We must raise the struggle in the trade unions, explain politically to the American working class what it is all about.

NEEDLE

From Speech of Leading Comrade of Shop Nucleus

COMRADES, I am going to report on the experiences of a shop nucleus in one of the largest dress shops in New York City, working on the piece-work system.

In the shop we had a Y.C.L. member and a Party member. The workers were among the most exploited you could find in New York City. The boss had come from Maine and brought to New York City the methods he had used in Maine. He kept the workers in constant terror, barking at them continually and reminding them that they should be thankful they have a boss to work for, killing the confidence of the young workers that they could ever become dressmakers. In this way, the workers were afraid to speak to the boss, he was some sort of a god higher up.

The workers were not friendly to new workers. The first task facing the comrades was to win the friendship and confidence of the workers. The comrades were in the shop only two weeks when the boss gave a 5 percent wage-cut to the operators. The younger workers were rebellious but the older ones took it sort of quiet. The young workers hollered "Strike," and the comrades urged the workers to get together and talk to the boss. It was decided to do this the next morning, but by morning they had calmed down and

didn't want to talk to the boss. They said to our comrade: "Well, you speak to the boss." She said, "All right, I will speak to the boss at lunch time but you must follow me up." When lunch time came around she approached the boss, but the other workers did not follow, as they had promised.

The boss argued with her, he said, "How dare you come and argue about the price!" And she said, "Well, I want to increase my salary." This put off the boss's suspicion and gained prestige for our comrade among the workers for showing the spunk to speak to the boss.

Soon after this, we recruited into the shop a Y.C.L. member and a Party member.

The Y.C.L. comrade worked among the young workers, who were doing stamping work, which blistered the hands of the girls. They wanted rubber gloves, but were afraid to ask for them. The Y.C.L. member showed them how to get these gloves and this won the comrade some prestige. In the cutting department we were able to recruit another Y.C.L. member through union members sent up from the union to colonize the shop. These two colonizers from the union are still working.

Break Isolation from Workers

We tried to show the other comrades the advantage of carrying on the role of having the boss like them and make him think they are good slaves, at the same time pointing out to the workers the boss's maneuvers; we saw how he kept the workers divided. By keeping a certain number of workers' boxes piled up with work, though they had no more right to open their mouths than the others, the other workers were jealous and so they were kept divided. We were not able to overcome this until we were in the shop two months. We had to win these workers through friendship, through social discussion, a conversational manner, a real friendly basis, so that the workers would not feel we were trying to get something from them. If they brought lunch, we brought lunch; if they went out, we went with them, and in this manner we were part of the workers and not an isolated sect.

The workers began to watch how the boss maneuvered and agreed that we were correct. The boss began to sense that there was something going on in the shop and we warned the workers that we had to be careful, not to associate with us too much in the shop. Stool-pigeoning was going on to the point where comrades were followed into the restaurant. When this was observed, our comrades invited the forelady and other stoolpigeons to sit at the table with them. The workers admired our technique and it raised us in their estimation.

Hold Meetings in Ladies' Room

We were also able to hold meetings in the different floors, in the ladies' rooms. The workers began to realize they weren't fooling around with workers who did not have a head on their shoulders.

The hours in the shop were tremendous—8:30 to 7:00, and all day Saturday and sometimes on Sunday. We prepared the workers against working on Sunday. How did we do this? It happened that the boss did not tell us a day or a half-day before, in fact, he told us an hour or so before closing on Saturday, so the workers were not ready with some back talk. He would come and bark at them that they had to work on Sunday, and the workers were terrorized. But this time our comrades spoke to the boss and said they were not coming in to work on Sunday because they were told too late and had made other arrangements. The workers saw this, and going out of the shop the comrades realized their position, that they might be thrown out. So we got hold of the boss outside and told him not to feel sore, and he told us, "It's all right, you keep quiet, just don't come in." The entire shop came in except those two comrades. The next week there was much bitterness. Although he had prepared to have them work again the following Sunday, they were prepared to refuse, and he dared not ask them to work.

We Organize through Small Group Meetings

In the beginning we formed a group of five workers and called them to a meeting. After this meeting of a group of five, we had a group of three, and then a group of 28, at which we organized a captain system, which meant that every plant had two captains in charge of the work at the plant; where any issue should arise, the captain should be informed and then inform the leading captain, or if the workers heard of it first, inform the different captains and the leading captain. It was so well organized that we put it to a test at a time when additional work was added on to a garment previously done by a different craft. We had a group of 28 but we had won the confidence of the entire shop by drawing in workers that we took from the cliques in the shops—we knew these were the leaders and we knew that through these leaders we could penetrate deeper. Thus we neutralized the rest of the workers so at least if they were not with us they were not against us.

After this we took another major step. The Party and Y.C.L. comrades were coached on how best to approach the workers in the group, not to antagonize those that did not immediately come in with us, how above all we must maintain their friendship. When we had a more difficult garment and the boss told the workers they had

to make it for the same price as a plain garment, the workers in the group demanded action. Captains got together and discussed the plans. The decision was made that the leading captain approach the boss for a raise and the other captains mobilized the workers. After a 20 minute struggle we got a 10 cent raise, from 25 to 35 cents. This was done in such a manner that nothing was known by the boss until the action occurred.

Later on rumors began to spread that he was not really going to give the workers the 10 cents, which began to discourage the workers, but we were determined that he was going to pay us the 10 cent raise. We pointed out that we still have to fight for it.

Take Steps to Guard Workers from Exposure

The group decided to call a meeting to discuss what steps to take. The meeting was arranged so that workers would meet at certain corners and no one knew the address where we were to meet except the leading workers. We told them that if they had any suspicion that they were being followed (the boss's stoolpigeons were getting active) they were to go home and not bother about the meeting. We held the meeting and pointed out that the boss is not going to give the 10 cents without trying some maneuvers, perhaps firing one worker as a start and finally firing all of the leading group. This, by the way, is exactly what did happen. Two days before pay-day, the boss picked on a comrade whom he thought the workers wouldn't fight for. The day before firing the worker the unit met and discussed what method to apply to the new situation. The comrade in the leadership would be the spokesman. The stoolpigeons of the bosses were there, however, and pointed out to the workers that we were being led by the Communists, but we succeeded in counter-acting all their maneuvers. We learned that we have to be very sharp in exposing these stoolpigeons, but we must not attack them personally but expose their tactics and in this way the workers will fight with us instead of against us.

Must Be Flexible in Our Work

The strike was won and although the economic gains were not so big, the workers feel they have gained some freedom as well as stopping the danger of wage-cutting.

What I want to bring out is that though we disagreed with these workers on many points, at least they did not come and fight against us. We must not raise a fence against the workers because they disagree with us. You cannot speak to young workers as you would to older workers and to inexperienced workers as you would to experienced ones. We must be flexible and our application must be very dialectic.

With regard to the work among the women, we have very important experiences in this field which should be fully brought out, especially in the reports from the districts. I have in mind especially the strikes of the Negro women, the nut pickers in St. Louis and the needle workers on the South Side in Chicago. These are really historical strikes. The strikers were mostly young Negro women who were striking for the first time; they carried through struggles, established their own leadership, won battles and built up unions—these are things which certainly should fill us all with enthusiasm and confidence for a real tremendous mass movement in this country. When we see young Negro women doing these things while we are sitting around complaining that we were not able to do them, among miners, steel workers, etc., we must blush for shame. In this connection it is very interesting to note that these Negro women are doing good political educational work. In St. Louis they have just sent in an order for 500 copies of every issue of the Working Woman. They are carrying on a systematic campaign of education, distributing literature, holding discussions, etc.—From Comrade Browder's Report.

EXPERIENCES IN WORK AMONG WOMEN

*From Speech of Anna Damon, Head of Women's Commission,
Central Committee, C.P., U. S. A.*

I believe that in spite of the fact that work among women did not receive any too much attention at this conference, through the various reports we have received a real expression of problems in the districts, particularly among factory workers, with regard to work among women. If we are going to take the Open Letter seriously and work along these lines, especially in the shops, we cannot isolate the question of how to involve the women.

I want to review briefly the strike struggles of the first six months of 1933. Almost all industries were involved in strikes. However, outstanding in these strikes were five industries, textile, clothing, shoe, food and tobacco. More than half of the workers involved in these strikes were women, and the majority of these strikes were spontaneous.

In many instances the A.F. of L. came into these strikes at the request of the bosses and succeeded in diverting these militant struggles of women. But we must ask ourselves: where were we?

Wherever our industrial unions did come in directly or indirectly, helping and guiding the workers daily, as in the Salem, Mass., textile strike, and wherever our leading comrades took an active part in these strikes, some successful results can be recorded. We cannot go into detail as to these spontaneous, militant strikes, particularly the fifty-five strikes in the Southern textile field, but one thing is clear, that we did not put ourselves at the head of this strike movement to defend the daily interests of the working women.

No Fight for Labor Legislation for Women

With regard to labor legislation for women, the drive in the Eastern textile districts for bringing down the living and working conditions of the textile workers to the level of the South and Governor Ely's (Mass.) proposal for abolishing the laws prohibiting night work by women, our activities were and remain very limited.

The weakness of our organization and agitation in the textile field in the face of the outright betrayal of the United Textile Workers in the interests of the bosses, the lack of organization among the textile workers as a whole is one of the factors governing the choice of the textile industry as the first in which to put over an industrial code. The U.S. administration realized that the first attack should be made upon the weakest and least organized industry which would set the pace for the other codes to follow.

* * *

We have about 20,000 members in the Party, with an average dues payment of 17,500. Out of these, 3,287, or about 19 per cent, are women. Of this number, 1,568 are housewives and 1,719 are working women. A large number of registered housewives are also part-time workers, particularly the Negro women. This is a definite improvement in the social composition of the women Party members in the past year; we have now close to 300 Negro women in the Party and approximately the same percentage of the total Negro membership as that of the general percentage of women in the Party, namely 19 to 20 per cent.

Since the Sixteenth Plenum we have a recorded increase of 700 women in the Party, that is, those that remained after the turn-over. The situation in St. Louis, and the positive results for the Party in recruiting Negro women should make the districts extremely conscious of the possibilities to make gains among the most oppressed section of the American working class.

Comrades, I want to point out that if we are to judge the workers generally, the young workers, the Negro workers, the women workers, as to how long we have had them on trial before we admit them in the Party, we will not make the headway demanded of us in the Open Letter. We must judge the workers according to their

militancy, seriousness and activity in the struggles that they participate in. This is the decisive point.

Non-Party Worker Combats "Red Scare"

If you want an example, let me tell you about Comrade Carrie Smith, chairman of the St. Louis strike committee, in contact with our movement only about two weeks, who defended the Communist Party against the "red scare" attacks of the city administration. Let us compare her stand with that of some of our comrades who have been in the Party leadership, and leaders in the unions for years. This woman, 42 years old, who had never participated in the labor movement, was called by the Mayor of St. Louis to an arbitration meeting at the City Hall to negotiate about the strike. He insisted that the Communist Party organizer be excluded from the negotiations. He asked her:

"Why didn't you get in touch with Urban League to represent you instead of the Communists?"

She told him: "The Urban League and all the rest of them knew we were sitting in that sweat shop for nothing. None came to our rescue but the Communist Party and I think that I have just as much right to choose who I want in my council as you have in yours."

It is enough to say that we now have over 100 Negro women and girls in the Party and Y.C.L. in St. Louis and that the prestige of the Party in St. Louis is very high.

One Task in Plan Carried Through

After the Fifteenth Plenum of the Central Committee the Women's Commission, C.C. set itself a number of tasks. One out of these was carried through. To date we have printed five issues of *The Working Woman* in improved magazine form selling for 5c.

The magazine is well received and really has a mass basis and can be distributed by tens of thousands among the working women in textile and other basic industries as well as wives of workers at concentration points. But what is the actual situation? Instead of increasing the distribution, we have had to limit each issue to 8,000 copies, because the districts are not using the magazine for specific agitation and propaganda.

As to finances, it is worse than scandalous. It is considered a legitimate practice in the districts to use *Working Woman* money to make up all sorts of expenses for leaflets, halls and deficits in connection with work among women.

The districts in taking stock of financial responsibilities to the C.C. must also consider *The Working Woman*.

It is a scandalous situation that in the ten years of the Daily Worker's existence and in the fourth year of the crisis, with seventeen million unemployed, with strikes and wage cuts, and struggles of all kinds going on everywhere, the masses beginning to surge upward, even the petty bourgeoisie coming into mass struggles—and the Daily Worker circulation does not grow, it goes backward. And nobody seems to get excited about it. The question of Daily Worker circulation becomes one of life and death for our Party.—From Comrade Browder's Report.

THE DAILY WORKER

Excerpts from Speech of Clarence Hathaway, Editor of Daily Worker

COMRADES will be interested in knowing what the results of the circulation drive have been up till now. I will take the concentration districts. New York, for example, during the month of May while the subscription drive was on, secured 67 new subscribers to the *Daily Worker*. But while it was securing 67 new subscribers, they dropped 90 old subscribers. If you take District 5—Pittsburgh—during this month, they took in 17 new subscribers. They dropped 35 old ones. District 6—Cleveland—took in 41 new subscribers and dropped 62 old ones. District 7 took in 46 new subscribers and dropped 48 old ones. Take Chicago—66 new subscribers—and they dropped 92 old ones. This is the subscription drive that is now being conducted by the Party for the *Daily Worker*.

Daily and Mass Party

I think, comrades, that these figures speak more emphatically than any words that could be said by myself. Every comrade that hears those figures and does not feel really ashamed as to the position of the *Daily Worker* certainly does not take the work of the Party seriously and is not in a position now to take the Open Letter seriously. We have got to make the comrades realize that with figures of this kind we can never become a mass Party of the American workers. We can never make this turn demanded by the Open Letter, we can never place ourselves, seriously place ourselves, forward as that force capable of leading the struggles of the American workers.

Staff Isolated

I know that the comrades of the Districts have many complaints against the Daily, many of which are justified. The paper

has not been able to fulfill its functions. But here, comrades, we have to bear in mind that there are also reasons for this. We have had a situation where, to begin with, the staff of the paper has been isolated almost completely from the life of the Party as it developed from day to day. Likewise from the life of the workers. We have also had a situation where the staff of the paper were journalists not deeply rooted in mass struggles of the workers, but who came to the paper with little experience of these struggles.

Secondly, we have not had a close living political contact between the *Daily Worker* and the districts of the Party. The districts of the Party today send us a little news item in which they will tell us about one or another demonstration that took place in their district. These are important, comrades, and the *Daily Worker* must find ways and means of getting this material into the paper. But there are things that are even more important than these, and that is that the comrades really read the paper and give to the editorial staff of the paper their opinions of the manner in which we handle each question that comes up.

Workers Advisory Committee

How are we going to do this? We cannot do this merely in the editorial office of the paper. We have to introduce a policy, all the way down the line, which ties up the paper closer to the masses of workers. One of the things that we have to carry out is the building up of a Workers' Advisory Committee, organized from the factories and trade unions, that will meet to discuss the problems of the paper. We want to build up a real representative committee of workers who will come to us not for just an occasional meeting but who will meet regularly with the leading comrades, to help us very quickly carry through this change.

Furthermore, under the direct and personal leadership of the District Organizer of the Party in every district—and particularly in the concentration districts, there must be set up a Workers' Advisory Committee that will meet not less than once a month with the District Organizer, to discuss the manner in which the *Daily Worker* has reflected the struggles of the workers, the needs of the workers, etc., On the basis of this discussion, the District Organizer must assume personal responsibility for seeing that a full report is sent to the editorial office of the *Daily Worker*. This is necessary, comrades, if a real change is to be brought about in the paper. Furthermore, this is necessary if you are going to develop a *Daily Worker* consciousness in the districts and build the paper as a popular mass organ.

WORK AMONG UNEMPLOYED

Among the unemployed masses, the struggle is being exceptionally sharpened by the latest phase of the "new deal" and we must develop a counter-offensive through our unemployed organizations, developing a real mass fight against those relief cuts which are taking place almost everywhere throughout the United States today. We must take much more energetic steps to bind together the struggle of the employed and unemployed, to bring expressions of support from the workers in the shops to every struggle of the unemployed, even if it is only a resolution or leaflet, even the smallest expression will grow and develop into something bigger. At the same time, more carefully and more systematically and energetically bring the unemployed workers into active participation in every struggle that takes place in and around the shops in support of the demands of the employed workers.

—From Comrade Browder's Speech.

From Speech of Leading Comrade of Unemployed Councils

THE weakness of our unemployed movement has been recently most sharply brought forward through the conventions that have taken place, organized under the leadership of the Musteites in Ohio. It is necessary that we take note of the fact that our movement is no longer the only unemployed movement in the field, and that we are not the only ones who have the capacity to organize the unemployed. We have seen in the recent period since the first of May particularly a number of conventions of the unemployed in which there were represented broad masses of unemployed workers entirely outside of our immediate influence.

It is true that the delegates at the Musteite Convention both in Ohio and nationally are more politically backward than are those workers organized in the Unemployed Councils under our influence. But although they may be more backward in their general political understanding of the problems confronting them, they are no less militant than those workers organized in Unemployed Councils and just as ready to struggle and to accept precisely such a program as we place before the Unemployed Council and organize the Councils around. So that we see it is not some special kind of workers being organized by these Musteites but the same kind of workers that we are organizing and failing to organize in the Unemployed Councils.

Lack of Faith in Workers Narrows Unemployed Movement

Why is our movement so narrow? The Open Letter very clearly places some reasons as they apply to the unemployed movement as well as the other phases. In the first place, there is still a lack of faith in the masses manifested in our Party. Comrade Browder dealt with it in a previous plenum. We have said—more faith in the masses, but we have not developed that faith. We are still afraid to organize broad masses of workers because we are afraid we will not be able to control them. We have had comrades frankly state that they do not dare to organize a broad movement as we do not have enough Party forces to be able to control it. And this attitude, this conception that we must mechanically control these broad mass movements is one of the reasons why we have not approached the task of organizing the unemployed on a broad mass basis. Instead we have very often deliberately tried to narrow down the movement.

In New York City where we have 20,000 or 30,000 members of the T.U.U.L. we cannot get more than three to four thousand organized in the Unemployed Councils after four years of crisis. Can anyone say that Unions, who are *supposed* to be the leaders of the unemployed movement, *are* the leaders when this is the case? I have seen comrades who have just come into the unemployed movement, who know more about the problems of the unemployed than those who are supposed to lead them, the leaders of the revolutionary trade union movement.

Most of the leaders of the trade union movement do not know the first thing about unemployed work. In this connection comrades must consider as to whether the program and even structure of the revolutionary unions has not to be somewhat reorganized on the basis of the experiences of four years of crisis and mass unemployment.

T.U.U.L. Unions Cannot Fulfill Present Tasks Without Leading Unemployed

It is manifest now that our unions are not adapted to giving leadership to workers in a period of crisis and since mass unemployment is now a permanent problem, our unions, therefore, will to a very considerable extent have to modify their structure. The unions cannot fulfill their role as far as the unemployed are concerned merely by organizing industrial councils.

They will have to be leaders of the unemployed in the neighborhood where the struggle takes place and if their organization is not adapted to this role, then they must take certain steps to supplement their form of organization with an additional form to make it possible for them to fulfill this role. If they don't do it, they will not

be able to give leadership to the unemployed masses. As to the Councils in relation to this, the comrades may think, now that we have as our basic control task the development of work in the shops, that this excludes the question of building the unemployed movement.

We will cite only a few of many instances that show how wrong such conception would be.

You heard news of how the unemployed are organizing workers in the shop. In Greensburg, Pa., where the Unemployed Council decided to organize a sweat shop and call a strike in it, they simply marched down in a body and pulled the workers out on strike and they won.

Now it is evident that these masses of workers who have learned the lessons of militant struggle are going to be an important factor in the building up of our organization and struggles in the shop.

United Front From Below Only Guarantee for Struggle

The recent conventions held have shown not only the possibility of unifying the unemployed and the correctness of this decision, but have shown that the workers want to unite. They have also shown the sabotage on the part of all elements outside of our movement, on the part of renegades. The Lovestoneites and Trotzkyites were the ones who took the forefront in the fight against unity, and these elements incidentally, the Trotzkyites particularly, are influencing the majority of the members of that National Federation Committee that was established in the convention in Chicago on May 13, 14 and 15. We will have to conduct struggles against these elements.

This committee cannot be the unifying force for the unemployed movement, but we must not completely abandon it. We must take steps to build up the united front down below; build up the Federation in the localities, and the various existing organizations for struggle around the immediate issues concerning the unemployed for guarantees that we will be in a position to control and conduct a campaign for unification and prevent sabotage on the part of these elements.

Cannot Let Demonstrations Replace Daily Struggles of Unemployed

On the question of marches and demonstrations, we have been discouraging in the recent period the organization of further state hunger marches. The Ohio Relief March was a good reason why we should discourage these actions. We cannot make them a substitute for the basic work of conducting the struggles down below in the neighborhoods every day. And the comrades in Ohio by organizing a relief march, found out that they failed to stop this,

but to a certain extent they even accelerated the downward trend of the unemployed movement in Ohio, and the manner in which they conducted it is open evidence of the manner in which we cannot conduct the united front.

Many workers did not participate in this Hunger March who wanted to because, they said "we were not consulted in the matter," and I might say nobody else was consulted in organizing this march.

Must Strengthen Fight for Unemployment Insurance

Our main emphasis will have to be on the organization of local struggles. Unemployment relief in the last year has amounted for 120 cities for 62 percent of the urban population, to \$313,410,370. And we see in this bulletin issued by the U.S. Department of Labor some interesting figures with regard to relief. For example, in face of a general average increase of 79.4 percent in relief throughout the country in 1932 as compared with 1931, relief in the city of Detroit has been cut 15.2 percent. That is entirely consistent with the decline of our unemployed council movement in Detroit.

We did not keep and develop the unemployed council movement in Detroit. As a result relief was cut, while in Chicago expenditures during the same period when the Unemployed Council in Chicago was on the upgrade were increased by 182 percent.

Must Lead Unemployed in Fight Against Low Standard of Living

We are not fighting against the tendency to make the workers adapt themselves to a low standard of living, and one of the reasons we are not fighting against it is because we are not fighting for unemployment insurance.

We are not making clear to the workers that they have a right to demand from the government a basis of existence consistent with what they have been able to earn during the period they work. Therefore, we are fighting a defensive struggle to prevent cuts in relief, but not to raise relief.

The campaign for unemployment insurance must be conducted as a campaign of struggle. We have a referendum campaign proposed in Ohio where the state law provides for a referendum, but we must not confine ourselves to these campaigns only on the basis of where the law permits us to. In this connection, bear in mind the correct criticism embodied in the article of Gusev on this question. We do not take the position that we scatter our fight for unemployment insurance state by state.

FOLLOW UP DEMONSTRATIONS

From Speech of Comrade A—— of Connecticut

IN New Britain we have carried on many struggles. We were able to mobilize thousands of workers at meetings of the unemployed council, thousands of workers came to our demonstrations, and still today we cannot show any kind of organizational results.

Why? Because, as the Open Letter points out, there is a lack of training and education among the Party members. In the unit in New Britain we have comrades who have been in the Party for three, four and five years, but who today are not able to give the necessary leadership to the new workers entering the movement. About a year ago, when I first joined, the unemployed council called a demonstration in New Britain protesting against single workers losing their jobs working for the city. Thousands of workers demonstrated. We were able to establish four or five ward committees. Hundreds of workers wanted to be active. For instance, the workers were willing to go out among married workers still working on city jobs and try to organize them to strike on the job in sympathy with single workers who were put out of work. With these non-Party workers we were able to sell 200 to 300 Daily Workers every day for about a month in this city where the population is about 70,000. We sold 1,000 Daily Workers in one day, August 1st. But today there is not one paper being sold.

Must Convince—Not Order Workers Around

We held weekly meetings of unemployed for about a month; the Party unit organizer used to come to these meetings and just issue instructions to these non-Party workers, saying "you must come here tomorrow, you will distribute some leaflets and next week attend a meeting," etc., not showing them how to organize and fight for their everyday demands.

What happened? After a month we lost about two hundred workers.

Why? Because there is no training, no education of the Party members; the Party members do not understand the line and the district leadership must take the responsibility.

Today we have about 30 members in the Communist Party in that city. We are starting to get some small results.

When I came out of jail I found some of the Party members themselves did not understand the line because they never read. They told me they went out and spoke to the workers and the workers are satisfied with Roosevelt. "We will have to wait until they find out themselves," they said. I asked them if they dis-

tributed the Daily Worker in front of the factories when it carried articles on the National Industrial Recovery Bill, if they distributed literature from house to house. No. Well, how do we know that the workers are satisfied? If we do not understand ourselves, how can we convince the workers? How can we know they are not militant?

Demonstrations not Followed up Organizationally

We have a Red Square in New Britain, similar to New York's Union Square. When the Unemployed Council issues a leaflet calling workers to demonstrate on East Main and Main Streets, the workers come out and demonstrate, because they are suffering, they are looking for a way to fight and get better conditions.

We were able to mobilize 8,000 workers on March 4. But we did not get organizational results. We should have gone to the neighborhoods with the campaign, distributing our literature, finding out what we can do for the workers and what they must do for themselves.

Now, for instance, we issue a leaflet calling an Anti-Fascist meeting. How do the workers know what Fascism means? If we do not distribute literature telling them what Fascism means, they will not know what we are talking about.

BREAK DOWN WRONG CONCEPTIONS OF LEADERSHIP

From Speech of Careathers, Section Organizer Pittsburgh

I want to tell you how a Negro alderman in the Hill section of Pittsburgh was forced to support the struggle for the freedom of the nine Scottsboro boys.

First, we sent a committee to this alderman, demanding that he take a position. He refused even to give a hearing to this committee. We organized a demonstration of 600 to 700 workers before his office. He called the police station which is about a block from his place, but the police were unable to break up the demonstration, and he was forced to contribute \$15 to the Scottsboro March. This is one instance which shows that the Negro reformists, like all the rest, when forced by mass pressure of the Negro and white workers, will come into the struggle, only, of course, with the purpose of diverting the mass pressure of the workers.

Comrade Markoff in his report said that sometimes we lag behind the masses of workers. In the Hill district, where I happen to be

section organizer, one portion of that section just outside the city is known as a KKK town. We organized a unit and began an unemployed movement, carried on some struggles, etc., and the movement began to grow. On one occasion the workers organized a big mass meeting in the school house. The workers came to the District Office and asked for speakers for this meeting. They told us they didn't want a speaker who was known to be a Communist. We told them we would send a Communist to speak at this meeting, and when these Party members found out that the speaker was not only to be a Communist, but a Negro, they threw up both arms, they said it could not be done in the KKK town of Wilkinsburg, that the workers were not ready to listen to a Negro. But we convinced them we could send a Negro speaker to this meeting.

We sent a Negro speaker and a white speaker who is also a Communist. The white comrade spoke, and then the Negro comrade was introduced and the audience of about 600 to 700 workers by their applause actually repudiated the position of the Party member who had said that the people in Wilkinsburg were not ready to hear a Communist speaker, nor a Negro speaker.

I point this out to show that in many instances the workers themselves are a little in advance of the Party members.

BUILDING A. F. OF L. OPPOSITIONS

From Speech of Leading Comrade in A. F. of L. Opposition Work

THE Cincinnati Conference marked a turning point in the history of organized opposition inside the American Federation of Labor. The Conference was called on the question of fighting for unemployment insurance inside of the A. F. of L. It was organized on this basis. It was a result of a referendum campaign conducted inside of the A. F. of L. for unemployment insurance. If we put the question to the District Organizers, to the District leadership, whether the comrades have taken the trouble to familiarize themselves with the decisions of the Cincinnati Conference, whether they have studied these resolutions adopted at the Conference, which were supposed to be carried into practice after the Cincinnati Conference, I can state very definitely, comrades, that it was not studied by our District Leadership and it was not carried into practice.

Comrade Browder in his speech stated that if he would call upon the comrades in this room to stand up and make a report and analysis of the Workers Unemployment Insurance Bill and compare it with the other unemployment insurance bills introduced by

the various capitalist parties, and state federations of labor, many wouldn't be able to do that, for the simple reason that they did not make a thorough study of the Workers Unemployment Insurance Bill. And it naturally follows, that the decisions of the Cincinnati Conference have not been carried through.

Build Oppositions in A.F. of L. Locals

Now if it was important for us to orientate ourselves in the past years to work inside of the reformist unions and build our revolutionary opposition, today it is ten times as important in the face of the Industrial Recovery Act and the consequences inside of the A. F. of L. of the Act.

Comrades, last year and months before, we came to Plenums, Central Committee meetings and we reported that the A. F. of L. was weakened. They have lost membership, according to their own figures, six to seven hundred thousand members. We know that the actual membership of the A. F. of L. at the last convention was a million and a half or not more than a million eight hundred thousand, but today the N.I.R.A. gives them the opportunity, as it was pointed out by Comrade Stachel and other comrades, to recruit hundreds and thousands of members into the A. F. of L. and if it was necessary and important to work inside of the A. F. of L. in the past, it is certainly necessary to work today.

I do not want to give too many figures, but I tell you comrades, the A. F. of L. has the machinery to utilize such a situation as created by the Act, and there is a possibility that Lewis, Green, and others will come to the next convention of the A. F. of L. and report the growth of one million new members.

On the preparation for the coming convention of the A.F. of L. I have to point out to the comrades the machinery of the A. F. of L. They have hundreds of weekly and monthly journals, small trades and Labor Council journals, in almost every city in the United States. They have 105 monthly trade journals, and to give more facts, I will give you an illustration of how this organization is built up. The A. F. of L. in 1931 reported the following:

- 104 Nationally established trade union organizations.
- 49 State federations of labor all over the Union.
- 804 Central Trades and Labor Councils all over the country.
- They have in these 104 Trade Union organizations about
25,000 union locals all over the country.

Now, comrades, I do not say that all these local unions and organizations function, but we see from experience that after the Recovery Act was adopted, all these organizations which had not

been functioning in the past came into existence, issued leaflets, and came out to the workers to organize.

We propose that we organize ourselves and concentrate on the coming A. F. of L. Convention. We believe that the coming A. F. of L. Convention which is going to be held in Washington is going to be a historical convention, and if we were able to mobilize at least 100 delegates last year to Cincinnati, to the convention this year we must mobilize at least 500 delegates from the A. F. of L. local unions and from the functioning opposition groups, and the comrades in the Districts should concentrate on the Central Trades and Labor Councils. The Districts should take seriously this coming A. F. of L. Convention. In the past we have not paid enough attention to these councils.

From Speech of a Leading Comrade of Shop Nucleus

THERE are about 500 to 600 men in the yards where I work and the conditions are terrible, due to the fact that there is no organization there whatsoever. If a man steps outside of the gate and listens to a speaker or accepts a leaflet, he can be stopped from work. If a speaker stands outside, the workers have to go right past without stopping.

About five months ago we started a nucleus in the yards and today there are eight members. We do all kinds of work. The bosses found out that something was going on, and they immediately started a terror threatening that everyone who had anything to do with the nucleus, if foreign born, would be deported, and if American born, he would not be able to work.

The painters who work in the yard are members of local——, A.F. of L. They have the same conditions, wage cuts, speed-up, and all kinds of grievances and our executive of the union will do nothing about it. All kinds of complaints come in.

Through the nucleus we started a painters' social club for the organized and unorganized workers. There are only about 156 members in good standing in the union, and about 400 unorganized painters. The local closed the books, so what could these 400 do? We organized a painters' club, and took in both non-union and union painters. Immediately the A.F. of L. came in with propoganda that it was a Bolshevik club, but nevertheless today the club has 42 members and is progressing.

From Speech of Katherine Erlich, Kansas District Organizer

I want to deal with our experience in the work in the packing plants. There we had some experience which will help the comrades in other cities where there are packing plants. Just two weeks ago we held a District Plenum and decided to concentrate on packing plants in three cities of the district. Comrade Gebert was present at this plenum. This district takes in five states and it is impossible to build a Party with such small forces. We, therefore, decided on the concentration on these three cities rather than spread our activities over the entire district and get nowhere.

In one packing plant, with thousands of workers, Negro and white, we had several connections for years. Meetings of these workers were called. The workers were told that we have to take up the fight against wage-cuts but not told how to begin. The workers didn't know how or what to do, and soon lost confidence in our Party.

Direct Guidance Given to Concentration Places

Finally, the district took up the question and sent a representative to work in this city and lay a basis for building something in the packing plants. This comrade had a hard time convincing the contacts that something could be done. He met with two or three of them, met with individual workers at their homes and in this way made connection with these workers. The entire unit was concentrating in the neighborhood of the plant. A Scottsboro mass meeting was held with 500 workers in attendance. The Negro and white workers after the mass meeting were heard saying that "if we organize and stick together, something can be done." We organized a shop unit of five members. They began to take up the grievances of the workers in the plant. They decided to give out leaflets and stickers in connection with a certain grievance and the demands were granted. One grievance for instance: more cattle were driven into the slaughter house than could be killed in nine hours. The workers were compelled to kill those remaining even after the whistle blew without receiving extra pay. The workers carried on a fight against this; they also carried on a fight against the efficiency experts, who were taking the jobs away from the workers. There is a sentiment in the plant for organization and our comrades sensed this. As a result of these struggles a shop group was organized.

Then came the Recovery Act. The newspapers in the city stated that the president of the A.F. of L. wants the workers to organize, and the comrades reported that in some departments there was

word going on of a meeting to be called by the A.F. of L. The capitalist press in fact stated that the A.F. of L. was coming to the city to organize the packing house workers, to organize all workers, because the president says so. The workers said, "Fine, we have the president behind us and now we can organize something." We had an idea and feeling that the A.F. of L. was calling this meeting and we had to prepare our comrades for it.

On Thursday before the meeting we had a meeting of nine packing house workers and they were told to prepare a program for the meeting. Another meeting was called previous to the A.F. of L. meeting and 20 workers showed up. Our comrades proposed that they work out plans. The workers were explained the purpose of this meeting called by the A.F. of L. But the workers insisted upon organizing their own union right away. They also prepared a leaflet for the workers coming to the meeting, calling upon the workers to take the floor at the meeting and to raise the following points:

- 1—For one union in the packing house industry; no craft unions, taking in Negro and white, men, women and youth.
- 2—To raise the question of low initiation fees and dues.
- 3—No bosses, straw-bosses or company men to be allowed in the union.
- 4—Union to take up the question of organizing workers in packing plants for higher wages.

Prevent Formation of A.F. of L. Union

The officials of the union at the meeting got up and spoke and asked the workers to join the A.F. of L. They read a letter sent by Bill Green telling the workers to beware of company unions. Those workers who were at Thursday's meeting exposed the A.F. of L. There was a member of the A.F. of L. present, a street car worker, and when he protested against an A.F. of L. union being organized, saying that the A.F. of L. helped to break their strike, he was told to be quiet. The A.F. of L. insisted that the workers join. There was a revolt. Finally some A.F. of L. member made a motion that this meeting go on record to organize into an A.F. of L. local. They took it to a vote and the majority said no. But the chairman said the "ayes" have it. The workers revolted, and asked that another vote be taken by hand and that was rejected. An old Negro jumped up and said, "You are not going to get me to join Local No. 28, we want a union of our own," and the secretary said, "Well, if you don't want Local No. 28 join Local No. 262." The Negro worker said, "Number or no number, it's the same stuff. We want a union of our own." The attempt of the A. F. of L. failed.

Steps are being taken to establish a union in the plant under our leadership.

The establishment of Bolshevik collective leadership in the Party is a primary prerequisite for development of the Party. Each Party member should take an active part in creating collective Party leadership.

There can be no collective leadership without active participation in the Party life and work of each member of the Party, especially those who bear on their shoulders the main weight of the work in the factories, shops, mines.

—From resolution adopted at the Extraordinary Conference.

WORK IN MASS ORGANIZATIONS

From Speech of Max Bedacht, Member Polburo C.P. U.S.A.

IN order to make the concentration of the Party upon the basic industries really an effective effort, it is necessary to kill quite a number of misconceptions that have dominated the minds of our comrades. Our Party members generally, and even our Party leaders have so often made the distinction that there are different kinds of work—mass work, Party work, work in mass organizations, trade union work—each one set up as a category with a wall between it and some other categories. And we have a division of labor organized within the Party—certain comrades are segregated in one kind of work and other comrades are segregated in another. Then we have a distinction as to the importance of the work. Those comrades segregated in the so-called unimportant tasks, are the fewest—and those segregated in the important tasks are the most. Yet the need of the Party is that we do not mechanically subdivide our members into those in one field and those in another, but that the Party as a whole is mobilized to work in every field.

Each Member Must Become a Leader

In order to have a Bolshevik Party, we must now see to it that all our work is organized in such a manner that *each individual member of our Party becomes* a leader of workers, a leader of a group of workers; this effort must be concentrated first of all in the shop, that is, where they are located whether they belong to an organization or not. That is the place where every Party member must make efforts to become a leader of as many workers as he can; wherever there are more than one Party member, wherever we have a shop, or a mine or any industrial institution with more than one Party member, there the effort to become a leader, to build the Party, to organize a union, to organize and lead struggles in the shop must be a collective effort of all of the Party members there.

If we concentrate the efforts of our leading committees to initiating and guiding the efforts of this work of all of our Party mem-

bers, we will change the Party fundamentally. First, because we will work among the basic sections of the working class. Secondly, because by getting in direct contact with these primitive issues of the class struggle our work will become concrete. We will end the old and often criticized character of the Party, that of being in the main a propaganda Party.

It will be a Party directly connected with the workers and with their problems. We will develop the initiative of the Party from below. A Party that depends for its initiative only on the top must more or less suffer from some abstractions, because the top is not in close contact with these issues. The top will get notice of these issues only when they become big, when they explode. The top will get notice of issues only of larger political character, exploding in the country here and there. But these issues that the individual worker feels, his treatment in the shop, his wages, the conditions of work in general—those issues do not always automatically create such high waves that they reach in their details the leading committees of the Party. These issues from below will strengthen the political life of the Party and will give concreteness to the functions of leadership.

How Will Turn Affect Work in Mass Organizations

One specific question that I want to deal with is how this turn in the activities of the Party will and must affect our attitude to the work in the mass organizations. We have very serious sins to confess in this field. We are confronted with the fact that some of our mass organizations, for instance the W.I.R. or even the I.L.D. which for years have demanded our serious attention—that some, and in fact all of these mass organizations in reality aren't mass organizations at all. In reality they are something that abstractly attracts the attention of quite large masses of workers, but they do not actually draw these masses of workers intimately into work for the solution of class struggle issues, they do not actually organize these workers. We have got to change our attitude to these mass organizations. We have got to drop the idea of the lack of importance of these organizations. I have met during my travels in the country again and again the idea that the I.W.O. is not an important organization; we just tolerate it; we just permit it to exist, but it isn't politically important; why should we "waste" energy to participate in the work of these organizations. They do not see the possibilities of reaching elements that the Party could not directly comprise organizationally, that the Party could at best reach only with general agitation, but not with proposals of immediate organization.

Sustained Work Impossible without Mass Organizations

Without these mass organizations the Party could not have leadership over these masses in a permanent organizational form. This lack of attention and this underestimation have turned in many instances into a purely financial approach, to a purely financial judgment of these organizations. Comrades that work in these organizations are considered to be unimportant because they do not do "Party" work.

A comrade told me yesterday that a delegate from——to the International Workers Order Convention when he came back to——from the convention told the comrades back there "well we have snatched Bedacht away from the Party and now we have got him." I want to assure the comrades that while I am in the I.W.O. I am not away from the Party but on the contrary, when we succeed in putting all leading members of the Party into active position of leadership of real organized masses of workers, only then their leadership becomes reality and ceases to be an abstraction.

Party Leaders Must Be Mass Leaders

If every member of the Polburo had 10,000, 15,000 or 20,000 actual organized workers behind him, as a Communist, as a leader, then the Party becomes a mass Party. If each comrade of the Polburo and the Central Committee—and that will be the policy we will carry out in the future—is given the specific task—(for instance, one of our Negro comrades who is now the guiding comrade of the Negro Department)—to become the leader of say 2,000, 3,000, or 10,000 Negro workers and Negro masses in Harlem, then he will be a real leader of the Negroes in the United States (applause). And we must approach the whole problem of mass organizations from that point of view.

If we can build the International Labor Defense into an organization of 100,000—and that is not a fantastic figure—as a matter of fact I think it is conservative—if we can build that organization into 100,000—100,000 workers not judged as to their quality of membership in the I.L.D. exactly by the number of cents they pay per month in the form of dues, but by the fact that they become active workers in and for the activities of the I.L.D., if we do the same thing with other mass organizations such as the W.I.R., the I.W.O. and build them into real mass organizations then the Party will be able to lead the masses in these organizations; when the Party has grouped around itself such a belt of organizations of hundreds of thousands of workers, only then, comrades, will our Party be a mass Party. Only then will we overcome the isolation of our Party and strengthen the Party in its work.

The Party can stand at the head of the national revolutionary struggle of the Negro masses against American imperialism only if it energetically carries through the decisions of the Fourteenth Plenum of the C.C. on work among Negroes. The Party must mobilize the masses for the struggle for equal rights of the Negroes and for the right of self-determination for the Negroes in the Black Belt. It must ruthlessly combat any form of white chauvinism and Jim Crow practices. It must not only in words but in deeds overcome all obstacles in the drawing in of the best elements of the Negro proletariat, who in the recent years have shown themselves to be self-sacrificing fighters in the struggle against capital. In view of this, special attention must be given to the promotion of Negro proletarians to leading work in the Party organizations.—From the Open Letter.

AGRARIAN WORK

From Speech of Leading Comrade of Sharecroppers Union

I want to point out and explain the present conditions and status of our organization in the Black Belt, the sharecroppers' union and also explain some of the victories we have won and our perspectives for developing deeper struggles in the Black Belt, the struggle for the right of self-determination in the Black Belt.

First I want to say, comrades, next month about the 6th will mark the first year of the existence of the Sharecroppers Union. During this period we have been able to organize between two and three thousand members. Out of all of these members we have not been able to organize one single white farmer, and have been able to organize only five Party units of 30-35 members.

Our union has accomplished something; some victories have been won. More victories could have been won especially with the tremendous possibilities which we have; but the reason we have not spread the union and have not built up a broader and stronger Party capable of leading the masses, the Negro sharecroppers and tenants, and also mobilize and lead the broad section of the white farmers, is because the Party is so small. And secondly it is functioning in a sectarian line and manner. Third, because we have not developed local leadership.

What are some of our victories? We were able to force the landlords on three plantations to cancel all debts held against the sharecroppers. These debts amounted to, that is the amounts of these debts ranged between 12 and 13 thousand dollars. While there were 3 or 4 hundred Negroes working as sharecroppers and the debts against them were as high as 3 to 4 hundred dollars, on all

three of these plantations we have forced the cancellation of such debts and also forced the landlords to promise that half of this year's debt will be cut.

Fail to Organize White Farmers

What are our main weaknesses, comrades? Our main weakness in regard to our union is our failure to organize the white farmers, croppers and tenants, especially right now when we have aroused very favorable sentiment among the white farmers who have come out and demonstrated their support to the struggle of the Negroes for the right of self-determination. We have not actually organized any white farmers but we have been able to utilize them to a certain extent so far as getting them to distribute a few leaflets in the communities where the whites are and where it is difficult for the Negroes to go in and we have been able to utilize them to confuse the formation of lynch mobs against the Negroes but we have not been able to actually organize any of them into any kind of organization. Why? It is because we have not built up a strong Party capable of giving leadership to the union, and because we have underestimated the importance, not the political importance or significance of the revolutionary struggle of the Negro masses in the Black Belt, but because we have underestimated the importance of building a strong Communist Party in the Black Belt capable of giving the correct leadership to the union, thereby influencing and bringing into our ranks the white farmers also. We have not spread the union. By this time we should have had five thousand members in the union and 100 members for the Party. We must first build the Party, secondly, spread the union. How will we do this? Firstly, we have set ourselves a quota to recruit for the union 2,500 new members by August First. A part of this quota has already been carried out. Second, in the counties where we have the organization built, the quota has been subdivided by each county.

Negro Masses Will Fight for Self Determination

On the question of the right of self-determination, I don't think that this conference placed enough emphasis on the work in the South, particularly in the Black Belt. I don't think the slogan of the "Right of Self-Determination" has been properly emphasized.

First of all, one of the main mistakes made by the Party was to take the L.S.N.R. out of the Black Belt, out of the South; since that time continuously we have been asked what happened to it; what happened to the Liberator? The Negroes in the South liked the Liberator; they like all our newspapers.

The next mistake made was to cut off the Southern Worker. Of

course, the Southern Worker is being published again, but this was a mistake, to cut it off. Until recently we have not been getting literature in the Black Belt. We got about ten Daily Workers every thirty days and now we are getting 70 Daily Workers every day and about 200 Southern Workers every two weeks, and no Liberators at all and no L.S.N.R. there, an organization which should be right in the midst of the Black Belt to help in the struggle of the Negro masses for the right of self-determination. We see again in the struggle for the right of self-determination the need for the L.S.N.R. We see again in the struggle of the croppers in Camp Hill in 1931 a shining example which evidenced the fact that the Negro masses in the Black Belt will fight for self-determination.

In the Black Belt the conditions, the pressure placed on the Negro masses are enough to urge them on in revolutionary struggle without agitating them, and telling them to defend themselves against the lynch mob. At the present time, especially in these sections and areas where our union has been built, these Negroes are going to defend themselves against the lynch mobs.

What is really wrong with the struggle is that it was too narrow, this struggle should have been linked up better. If we had had a strong, really disciplined Party, capable of leading the struggles of the croppers no matter what form they might have developed into, there would not have developed this Realtown situation; and there are going to be more struggles developed in the Black Belt.

Now, what are we doing now? We are preparing these farmers to develop and put through a reduction bill against confiscating of livestock, against evictions, and against the compulsory selling and holding of cotton.

We want the national leadership to explain to us how to win the white farmers in struggle with the Negroes, how to popularize the slogan "the right of self-determination for the Black Belt."

AGRICULTURAL STRIKES

From Speech of Sam Darcy, Organizer, California District

I WISH to speak on our agricultural strike, on the point that Comrade Toohey raised, that the question of unity between the workers and poor farmers, which at first looks almost insurmountable, isn't so at all. We can give you an example of this: On a small farm six workers were working, when the assessors' deputy officers came down to shut off the water because the farmer hadn't paid his water bill. The farmer came down to the workers and said, "I am very sorry but I'll have to let you go because I have no more water." The workers said, "The hell you say, we'll turn

your water on and we'll have our jobs back." And they went down and turned it on. And in actuality this bridge between the farmers and workers was made through an identity of interest. The poor farmer who has four or five laborers during the short harvest season has no difficulty in granting an increase of 5c an hour because he makes it up by getting his crop to the market early instead of being delayed by a strike; our struggle is against the rich farmers.

We Organize and Lead Agricultural Strikes

And finally, concerning the agricultural workers' strikes during this year, for the first time the Party and Union led a majority of the agricultural workers who struck in California. In previous years spontaneous strikes broke out all over but our Party came after the strike was organized. This year we had 9 strikes ranging from 250 in the small ones to 3,000 workers in the big strike. In 7 of the strikes we organized them, led them, concluded them, and formed our local union in the course of them. In two we didn't. In one of these two the Mexican Consul walked off with the situation because the American comrades stood in one group and let the Mexicans, excepting the youth, stand separately. The comrades came out and spoke in the name of the Party group but in the eyes of the workers it was the American workers who misled a few Mexican youngsters speaking to the Mexican strikers, and this gave the excuse to the Mexican Consul, who was a slick demagogue, to take the situation out of our hands.

In another strike 300 workers struck spontaneously and were led by the Philippine fakers. We were not able to get a fast hold.

One last word about the question of forces in our agricultural fields; we have the same cry that some districts have about forces; they say, we have no forces. We had a meeting in Santa Clara County of the Agricultural Workers Union. The Section Committee and the comrades said, "These Mexican workers, they sit around and won't speak up; how can we lead strikes with them?" But while these Mexican workers didn't talk in the committees, you should have seen them on the picket line. They were the most militant and effective of the leaders. Later on we said, "Why don't you recruit these workers into the Party" and the comrades said "they are not prepared enough or solid elements enough." A few days later 46 of our strikers were arrested and kept in jail for a week and tortured, the police tried to get information from them and they wouldn't say a word or budge an inch. Yet when we spoke to those comrades and asked why we didn't recruit these workers into the Party, they said they are not prepared! Needless to say, we held our recruiting, partly in jail, and got 24 of them into the Party.

TASKS IN AGRARIAN WORK

*From Speech of Henry Puro, Head Agrarian Commission,
C.P. U.S.A.*

COMRADES, what do the farmers' militant struggles signify and what lessons must we draw from them? I do not think it is only the farmers' own situation alone, but also the example which the little contact of the city proletariat with the farmers has been able to give. Lenin, writing on the Russian Party question and the question of winning over the peasants, as early as 1903 and 1905, points out that the peasants are coming to the cities and they learn about the workers' struggle which they do not yet fully understand.

On the question of unity among the workers. In this field we have had very interesting experiences.

In the farmer strikes, especially unemployed workers in Iowa last year, and in the Wisconsin strike unemployed workers assisted farmers in picketing and in fighting for their demands. On the other hand unemployed workers have been participating in many struggles together with the farmers.

In Eastern Pennsylvania we have made some systematic progress on this work. They have also distributed milk for the unemployed families. In the preparation of the Philadelphia strike it is known that there has also been systematic organizational measures in order to prepare for joint action.

At the opening of the farmers' conference in Pennsylvania this solidarity with the workers was not expressed by all delegates at the conference but had been actually recognized in the course of struggles of the workers and also of the farmers. I think mistakes made at the conference are definitely mistakes of right opportunism and hiding the face of the Party at the conference.

Must Overcome Resistance to Building Party

There has been considerable hesitancy and some resistance in building up the Party in some of the most strategic centers of our mass work among the farmers, for instance, in Eastern Pennsylvania, where by systematic and consistent work we have drawn over a thousand organized farmers very close under the leadership of the Party.

The farmers with few exceptions didn't know that the Party was actually leading these organizations and their struggles. There has been systematic resistance to building of the Party up until now and the leading people in these organizations have not been drawn

into the Party, although they have been very close to, and even willing to accept the leadership of the Party.

There has been even such a theory developed that a Party unit or a Party fraction cannot meet in the countryside, not openly or in a secret form. Of course, this theory must be corrected. How will Party units be able to meet in conditions of terror, illegality, etc.? There can be no such theory that the Party unit or Party fraction cannot meet. This would mean liquidating the Party, this would mean putting such obstacles that would make it impossible to build the Party.

Must Expose Roosevelt's Farm Bill

Against Roosevelt's Farm Bill I think we must put more definitely the emphasis than even on the cancellations of the debts of the poor, small and middle farmers. We have partially launched this slogan already, but when we explain the real meaning of the Roosevelt Farm Bill, that it doesn't benefit the position of the toiling section of the farmers, but it means further enslaving them and it means more ruthless foreclosures on their homes and farms—I think then we are laying the basis for the cancellation slogan of the debts of the toiling farmers, and although we have been somewhat hesitant in putting forth these slogans, I think when we explain this question thoroughly to a large section of the toiling farmers, they will readily rally around this slogan and this slogan could become a means of politicalizing and revolutionizing our struggles. Around this slogan greater masses of farmers could be mobilized, also further militant mass struggles.

Party's Tasks to Organize Agricultural Workers

The every-day work of the Party among the farmers and in the villages must be planned and has to be in line with our main resolution, that is with the draft Open Letter to the Party Conference, in order to render active support for broadening and strengthening the proletarian base of the Party. This means also we must take up energetically the organization of the agricultural workers. Some preliminary work has been already done in this respect, and comrades, when I speak on this question I do not mean just that the Party should give an order to the T.U.U.L. in this work. I think we must realize that the task of the T.U.U.L. is now to build red trade unions in the main basic industries, and therefore in regard to the agricultural workers, the Party with its apparatus and its forces in the mass organizations must take chief responsibility instead of the T.U.U.L. in this respect.

UNITY OF FARMERS AND WORKERS

*From Speech of Ella Reeves Bloor, Member Central Committee,
C.P. U.S.A.*

I WANT to give you three instances of outstanding conferences that we had recently, one of them only a week ago. But first I want to speak of the Philadelphia conference. That conference was organized by the *Communists inside*. This conference was called by the President of the United Farmers Protective Association of Pennsylvania. They invited all other organizations and it was held in one of the Esthonian halls in Philadelphia, where I used to hold forth to the textile workers years ago. And here we were with farmers, in these big organizations of the workers, and these farmers were led by Comrade Benzley.

They came from New Jersey and all around and that conference was marked by the fact that there were many workers' delegates there, not paper delegates but live men from the Carpenters Union, from the Food Workers, from the Unemployed, from the womens' organizations, they came as delegates to this farm conference, but they did not try to run it. They were organized in a Bolshevik manner. They came to me—two or three of them—and said, "we have been invited to serve on the Resolutions Committee—can we serve, do you think?" I said, "yes, two or three of you, of course." After the Resolutions Committee, they came up to me and said, "Mother Bloor, we did not have to protect the workers' interest on that committee as we thought we would have to—why those farmers protected our interests—they said if we raise the price of milk to five cents a quart, then we must lower the price of milk to the consumers, who are the workers, and so they continually fought in the interest of the workers as well as the farmers." The conference passed resolutions and went on record against all imperialist war, against the national guard and the state cossacks in Pennsylvania.

Break Down Red Scare Among Farmers

And then only a week ago I was way down 500 miles from my home town in Nebraska, at a state conference of farmers called by the Madison County Plan in opposition to the Reno Holiday Association Plan. There was a large bona fide gathering of delegates here, at which we also had our Party representative, Comrade Omholt.

He went down there with us and he said to me, "How am I going to introduce the Party among this bunch?" I said, "Just as soon as the 'red scare' comes up, that is your time." So somebody—an old Norwegian—(Omholt is a Norwegian too)—got up and said,

"I just heard that Mother Bloor is going to speak on Russia at the picnic tomorrow. I think we ought to sing 'America,' we don't want Russia here," so all of us sang America with them. Sometimes I have even had to pray with them. You ought to hear my prayers. Then Comrade Omholt, after the red scare was introduced, came up in good time—just after the Farmer-Labor Party man spoke and a social-fascist—he came up and said:

"I have been hearing about a red scare, and don't know what you mean by that. Are you afraid of the Communist Party? You seem not to be afraid of the bosses' party that feeds you with all kinds of illusions about what Roosevelt promises will do for you"—and then he slammed into the Allotment Bill, inflation and gave them a political speech against Roosevelt's policies—and then ended up: "I am proud to be a member of the Communist Party."

Well, you ought to see how they all liked him all the better after that. And then at the picnic some of the farmers came to me and asked me to speak about the Soviet Union. Why? Because they know it is the *only hope* for the workers and farmers. And the day after, Omholt weeded out fifty men who wanted to form their own party down there and I will tell you the secret of it all. Not what we said there perhaps, but the fact that we had two or three copies of the *Daily Worker* down there in that neighborhood that they had read and this made them come to us to find out more about the Communist Party. We went to one of their houses and with us was a Y.C.L. member, and other comrades and he got 25 members into the Y.C.L. and established three units of the Party.

Every letter to you from the farmers is backed up with *struggles* just like this Negro comrade who came here, and spoke yesterday from North Carolina. Comrades, if these comrades can come here, and express themselves so well about the struggles they are conducting down South like these women we ought to be ashamed of ourselves for taking the defeatist attitude that some of us do in this part of the country, and I want to emphasize what Comrade—— said to you, that the work that is going and will be going on in the South among the Negro workers is tremendous. But as he said, it won't amount to anything, unless we put our whole power behind the organization of the workers in the South. I say again to you miners—I am almost tempted to leave the farmers and come down to your section. But if I do come down—watch out. Comrades, let us have *unity—not on paper—not just cold letters—but unity of workers and farmers—unity of our ranks*. Brothers—brother miners, don't be jealous of each other—you are all good workers—some can read, some can write, some can organize—let us push and pull collectively, pull together.

STRENGTHEN POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING

From Speech of A. Markoff, Director of Workers School

LINKED up very closely with all the phases of our work is the question of political education. Comrade Lenin, in "*What is to Be Done*" devoted a good deal of time and attention to this question. He said that political education means the immediate reaction to political events on the part of the revolutionary movement and training of workers in the understanding of the events.

The Open Letter deals with this question when it asks: "Why is it that the entire Party, from top to bottom, is not working to determine the best ways and means of establishing contact with the most important sections of the workers; understand and persistently and patiently help them to organize the struggle against hunger? Why is it that the Communist fractions in the revolutionary unions do not have the correct estimation of this in order to overcome these main weaknesses? Because in the Party, and particularly among the leading comrades, there is a deep-going lack of political understanding of the necessity for strengthening of our basis among the decisive section of the American workers."

Double Task to Educate Members and Masses

On the question of political education, the Party has several tasks: to educate its own members, and to educate the masses. These two, while separate phases of the work, are interlinked, and I am going to deal with these two particular phases—the phase of education within the Party and also the dissemination of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism among the wide masses of workers outside of the Party, and among other sections of the population.

Now let us see what the Party has done so far as education within the Party is concerned. In my opinion, not sufficient. One of the greatest achievements of the Party so far has been the elimination of the contempt for theory that was prevalent throughout the ranks of the Party for a good many years. The Party membership is today really interested in theory. Every Party member should read Comrade Lenin's works or at least part of "*What is to Be Done*," where Comrade Lenin devoted a whole chapter to the question of theory, and where he quotes from Engels in an introduction to the "*Peasant War in Germany*" that the struggle of the workers is carried on in three phases: theoretical, political, and practical economic. The theoretical phase of the struggle is placed on the same level with the political and economic. This they are beginning now to understand. The Party also conducted practical work in this direction.

EXAMINATION OF SHOE STRIKE IN LIGHT OF OPEN LETTER

"Such systematic day-to-day work in the factories is the necessary condition for all serious preparation of strikes and for the launching of strikes at the proper moment. The workers will have confidence in us as strike leaders only if they see that we take every necessary step for the careful preparation of strikes, selecting the proper moment for the declaration of the strike, firmly welding the united front of all workers before and during the struggle, through fighting organs based on proletarian democracy, and if they see that we mobilize all moral and material assistance for the strikers and know enough to call a strike off at the proper moment if the mass of strikers are not able to carry the struggle further." (From the Open Letter)

WE work in a shoe shop located in Brooklyn, employing from 80 to 100 workers. Our nucleus is composed of four members. For the last year or so, our bosses have succeeded in forcing upon us about 32 percent wage cut, although always after a struggle. About seven weeks ago our bosses decided to liquidate, so our shop closed.

Previous to the closing of our shop, from one wage cut to the next we intensified our day to day activity, making positive contacts and organized a shop group under the leadership of the Shoe and Leather Workers Industrial Union.

When the shop closed down we managed to keep a large number of the crew together, meeting with them and preparing them for the reopening of the shop under one boss or the other. About the end of June, the shop was being prepared for work by one of the bosses with a few new partners.

Immediately we gathered our forces together and a committee was sent to the firm to reclaim our jobs. This was met with a refusal on the part of the firm to reemploy us collectively. With the help of our revolutionary union we got the workers together and declared a strike against this lockout.

After two weeks' struggle we gained all our demands.

Thanks to our clear solid stand and determination and our making clear to the workers the maneuvers of the bosses, we were able to defeat all their machinations. In spite of the self-sacrifice and devotion of the Party members and many other workers in the shop, we committed many errors and had many shortcomings. Our section and somehow our revolutionary trade union failed to give us adequate cooperation, support and guidance. So much so, that we failed from the beginning of the struggle to put forward such

demands as an increase in wages and recognition of the union.

While the union leadership was acquainted with the weak element comprising most of our strikers, we were left alone for almost full days in succession. The union as well as the section failed to mobilize their membership for active support to our strike.

There was the utmost lack of discipline. Especially among the Party comrades was it noticeable at any time during our strike and shop meetings. Due to the lack of consultation among the Party comrades prior to decisive actions, the comrades very often contradicted and attacked each other in open meetings (this includes also the union organizer).

While we decided to try and spread the strike, we failed to do so due to the fact that our comrades were all the time on the go, trying to keep the strikers together, and to develop their fighting spirit. It was due to the lack of support given us by the sections and union membership that we failed to spread the strike.

"All leading bodies, especially those in the sections must reorganize their work on the basis of the carrying out of revolutionary mass work. Revolutionary work is the task of the entire membership. The secretaries of the leading bodies in their work must not replace the work of the membership. It is their task to plan and organize work together with the members, to give the members practical assistance in carrying out of these tasks." (From the Open Letter)

With the exception of the org secretary the section failed miserably to lend us any cooperation. In spite of the fact that the section buro knew of the coming struggle weeks in advance and promises of help were vouched for, they all came to nought. The section membership and especially a shop nucleus working four blocks away from our shop failed to do their Communist duty, when on four consecutive occasions they were called to assist us to picket. We have failed with very little exceptions to bring the face of the Party to the fore during our strike struggle.

In spite of all these shortcomings we have been able to consolidate our forces, so that every worker in the shop has joined the union voluntarily.

In conformity with the Open Letter, we pledge ourselves to intensify our work in the shops in order to consolidate our forces and make the bosses live up to their agreement. We pledge ourselves to avoid the repetition of our past mistakes in failing to follow up our victories by intensified organizational work after the struggle is over. We pledge ourselves to concentrate upon those who during the strike have shown their steadiness and militancy: to bring them closer to the Party and into our ranks.

Resolution on the Application of the Open Letter Adopted by Section One Conference, Detroit District

THE Section Conference after a thorough discussion of the Open Letter declares its acceptance of it, and pledges itself to carry out its provisions in Section One. The main points of the Open Letter as they apply to our section are as follows:

- 1) Raising the political level of the membership.
- 2) Shop work and building up the revolutionary unions.
- 3) Negro work and the struggle against discrimination and white chauvinism.
- 4) Working out a concrete plan for two concentration tasks: a) Concentration on——plant; b) concentration in the Black Belt.
- 5) Strick check-up to see that all plans and decisions are carried into effect.
- 6) Struggle against sectarian practices; against social-fascists and white chauvinist tendencies.
- 7) Against financial irresponsibility.

Two Concentration Tasks

1. The concentration task of first importance to our entire section is the organization of the L.S.N.R. in the heart of the black belt. All of our section forces, but particularly units 8 and 9, with the cooperation of the District Negro Committee and some forces from the downtown sub-section must concentrate on building the L.S.N.R. and leading the Negro masses into struggle against race discrimination, hunger and mass misery. In the course of this struggle we must root out every vestige of the bourgeois poison of white chauvinism, both in the Party ranks and in the ranks of the mass organizations, including the language organizations, close to us and among the working class in general.

2. Our second concentration task is the organization of the —— plant workers into the Auto Workers Union. While this is also the task of the entire section, units 6 and 7 and one of the ——units shall concentrate on this task under the leadership of a comrade from the section and one from the district.

All the regular work of the concentration units must be so conducted that it will aid the concentration task. Leaflet distribution, *Daily Worker* and *Michigan Worker* sales, unit parties, lectures, mass meetings, canvassing for literature sales or signatures must be so conducted that it will aid in the concentration, and unit buros must carefully work out all activities with this aim in mind.

These two concentrations are not the property of only the units mentioned above, but must be carried on with the assistance of the entire section including mass organizations.

In carrying out these two concentration tasks, the work of recruiting new members, of building the Y.C.L. and the Young Pioneers, the improvement of our Party press work, the election campaign and all other Party campaigns must not be regarded as separate tasks taking the place of our main concentration but must be conducted in such a way that they will add to and strengthen our two major concentration tasks. In line with the criticism of the Open Letter we must learn to overcome our careless and bureaucratic organization methods in order that after every struggle we shall be able to realize the proper organizational results. The *Party Organizer* is one of the best guides in overcoming this and the comrades should study it more closely than ever before.

Hold Section Conference to Review Tasks

The Section Committee shall work out a concrete plan of action for these two concentration tasks, setting definite aims to be accomplished within six weeks. After six weeks a Section Functionaries' Conference shall be called to check up on how far the plan has been accomplished. During the six-week period, the buros of the cooperating units in the concentration points shall meet jointly. The plan need not be accepted in every detail by the units as presented but the units have the right to work out their own plan.

The Section Committee and its members will have to supervise the activities of the units and fractions more closely. The minutes of the previous meeting must be read, a strict check-up must be made at every section meeting. Leading comrades must be held strictly responsible for failure to fulfill decisions and assignments. Units and fractions also should keep minutes which should be read at the following meeting and then turned over to the Section Org Department.

Members of the Section Committee must meet with the unit buros and help them to prepare their work in such a way that only 3 or 4 points will come on the agenda of the units, in this way assuring sufficient time for a proper discussion on all points.

In Section Committees, units and fractions, a strict financial check-up must be made regularly by the Section Finance and Org Committee.

Unemployed Work

In all sub-sections, the Unemployed Councils are completely out of existence. Definite steps must immediately be taken to establish at least one Unemployed Council in each sub-section. Every unit, sub-section and the Section must elect an unemployment work director

who must meet Monday afternoon with the Central Unemployed Council and secure their help in reestablishing our unemployed work.

The concentration units in canvassing for contacts in the—plant concentration streets must not fail to build Unemployed Block Committees, when unemployed cases come to their attention or when they have a sufficient group of unemployed workers to make the establishment of a block committee possible. The other units must immediately select a certain number of streets of their territory as their concentration territory and work for the establishment of block committees in these streets.

The units in the Black Belt must connect their unemployed struggles with the building of the L.S.N.R.

International Labor Defense

The section must build a functioning fraction in the I.L.D. branches and direct the work in such a way that the I.L.D. branches participate in our concentration tasks along the line of defense work and winning contacts.

Fraction Work

Fraction members in mass organizations shall be organizationally controlled by the unit. The unit buros shall decide what unit assignments a fraction member can take in addition to his fraction work. Fraction members shall receive collection lists, tickets, leaflet distribution and other tasks from the units, except in special cases upon which the unit buro must decide.

Party fractions must be established in all mass organizations, or strengthened where they already exist, and the Section Committee must give close attention to the work of these fractions.

The Section Committee must see to it that the fractions properly bring all Party campaigns into the mass organizations, particularly unemployed and shop work. An educational campaign on the National Industrial Recovery Act should immediately be organized in all mass organizations and connected up with our shop, union and unemployed work.

The fractions, and particularly fraction committees must be cautioned not to work in such a way as to stifle the leadership of the regularly elected executive bodies of the mass organizations.

Daily Worker and Michigan Worker

In order to improve the exceptionally poor work of our section in the distribution of our Party press, the following steps must be taken:

1. Systematic check-up on all comrades selling the *Daily Worker*

and *Michigan Worker*, and securing of prompt payment which in turn must be promptly turned over to the District *Daily Worker* office. Lack of promptness in financial matters inevitably leads to confusion which finally results in the loss of large sums of money. This is the way in which most of the large bills have been accumulated, and this is why our Party press is always in a state of financial crisis.

2. Our section must see to it that factory sales are established at least at — and — shops.

3. Every unit should establish a route in its concentration streets, and work hard to get readers in a few streets rather than trying to cover ten blocks to get ten readers.

4. In every unit a unit workers' correspondent shall be elected whose duty will be to write all publicity about the struggle, conditions of the workers or the activities of our organizations to the Party press. These unit workers' correspondents to be called to a conference once a month together with the *Daily Worker* and *Michigan Worker* staff.

5. Section *Daily Worker* Committee must be elected to arrange ways and means for regular financial assistance to our press.

All work for the building of our press must be carried on in such a way as to further our concentration tasks.

Literature

The Section Agit-Prop Committee must establish a literature fund and develop the mass sale of literature in our section in such a way that it will be connected up with the section concentration tasks.

The section pledges itself to organize a full time functionaries' school in the immediate future and calls upon every unit to organize discussion groups including even close sympathizers where a program of discussion on important points can be taken up in the light of the Open Letter.

Our section pledges itself to participate in the District Concentration on the — plant, to help in the sale of — and to connect up our propaganda and organization work with this central District Concentration.

We pledge ourselves to turn all — contacts into the Organization Department and to assist in the establishment of — shop groups and shop nuclei.

CHECK-UP ON PLANNED WORK IN LIGHT OF OPEN LETTER

Statement on the progress achieved in carrying out the Plan of Work in Section——Chicago during the month of June 1933:

The Section Committee, reviewing the results, records first of all the fact that the units in the section are not guided in their daily work by the Plan. It seems that the prevailing opinion is that the Plan does not mean anything for the units. The unit organizers and the buros forget about it. The Section Committee has failed to remind continuously of the Plan and also to concretize some of the tasks.

The results during the first month are as follows:

1. *Shop Work*—A new unit has been organized in the H. shop. A union group has not been started.

In the M. shop there is a possibility of organizing both a Party unit and a union group because of developments in connection with the Industrial Recovery Bill. In the V. and A. shops, nothing has been done with the exception of visiting a few of the connections from the V.

The only thing done at the W. has been preparations for a meeting of Party members who have connections with employed workers of the W.

There is information received that there are favorable conditions for organizing in the R.

2. *Unemployed Work*—The West Suburban U.C. has not been organized yet. Attempts were made to organize an U.C. in the——Township, but the mass meeting was broken up by the police and we have no organization there as yet, in spite of favorable conditions.

In——we have established the U.C. finally. The open hearing at the end of the month was a success.

The G——U.C. is practically non-existent because it has failed to carry on any struggles. The Party members in it have failed most miserably to organize the workers for the struggle. After discussion with some of the comrades of unit——we came to the conclusion that it is not advisable to open up other headquarters in——, because it is impossible to raise finances during the summer months.

We have failed to organize women's committees and home owners' committees in the U.C.

3. *Recruiting*—Six units have failed to recruit any new members. Recruiting is very unsatisfactory. No working women have been recruited.

4. *New Units*—New units were established in—— and—— during the month of June.

5. *Young Communist League*—Y.C.L. unit of 10 members was established in B—. In M— and L— nothing has been done to establish Y.C.L. units. No Pioneer troop has been set up. Unit— has even allowed the—troop of 30 members to go out of existence.

6. *Daily Worker, Workers Voice, Literature*—No subs for the D.W. No subs for the W.V. Unit— is getting 10 copies a week now. We are selling 200 copies of W.V.

7. I.L.D.—Units—and— have secured about 20 names for the formation of an I.L.D. branch in—. The first meeting will be held on July 7th.

8. I.W.O.—The Italian comrades have organized a new I.W.O. in— of 30 members. In— there are only discussions about the I.W.O., but no organizational steps have been taken. The S.C. is not in touch with the Czechoslovak branch.

9. *Cultural Work*—No steps were taken to organize New World Club, or a workers' chorus or orchestra. Comrades are of the opinion that not very much can be done until late summer.

10. *United Front on Homeowners' Issues*—This important work has been neglected entirely. The Section Committee has failed to assign comrades for this work, and those comrades who were active before in this work have not done much to win taxpayers over to our program. This is just what the petty politicians, the reformists in control of the taxpayers' organizations want. The fractions in the B— and C— taxpayers' organizations are not functioning.

For all this activity the fractions will be responsible in the future. Comrades G— and P— are to call meetings of the fractions.

11. *Dues Payments*—Dues payments are satisfactory, but have not been organized properly as yet, and that is why we have not yet reached 100 percent stage.

This statement is issued so that the units can check up on their work and improve their activity. It should be understood that the Plan of Work is not to be read and put away, but should be used as a daily guide to action.

Is it possible to carry out such a turn in our work? Of course, it is possible. The members of the Party have shown in countless activities in strikes, in hunger marches, demonstrations and in painstaking day-to-day work, that they are loyal and self-sacrificing revolutionists. Now all members and all Party organizations must at once proceed to determine how the work of the Party can be improved and what practical measures must be adopted in order to guarantee and carry out the turn in the Party.—From the Open Letter.